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The Emergence of Large, Unitary Merchant-Banks in Dugento Tuscany

1. Introduction
The idea of the “corporation”, in its modern sense of a joint-stock company with
limited liability, was far from existence in the Middle Ages. Then there was no limited
liability, no stock market, no Industrial Revolution with factory production. Still,
economic historians do speak of a Commercial Revolution in the ‘long 1200s’ of the late
1100s into the 1300s.1 Along with the formation of the internationally oriented
Champagne fairs in France, the rise of the large unitary merchant-bank in Tuscany ranks
among the most important features of this Commercial Revolution.2 Instead of nationally
diverse merchants traveling with their wares to and from central markets in France, a
network of more-or-less-permanent branch offices developed in the mid-1200s, with
Italian (mostly Tuscan) sedentary merchant-bankers in their geographically distributed
filiali or branches effecting movements of goods and currency through letters among
themselves. Despite geographical dispersion, the company was ‘unitary’ in the two legal
senses of a single partnership structure, with different partners often heading different
branches, and of a single ‘master’ account book, located in the head office back home, in
which all activities were tabulated and held accountable. An impressive list of early
innovations in basic business technique followed this “rise of the sedentary merchant”3:
business letters, complex account books, and bills of exchange that moved money
without moving metal.4

1

Lopez, de Roover, Spufford, Goldthwaite, others.

2

I will not analyze in this paper the opening of trading routes to the Levant, which involved Genoa, Venice

and Pisa, even though these eastern trade routes provided part of the flow of trade underneath of the
Commercial Revolution. This flow from the east involved spices and other luxury goods. Florence, Siena
and Lucca were more centrally involved in the countervailing flow from the west, involving woolen textiles
produced in Flanders, and later in Florence, and silk textiles produced in Lucca. During the height of the
Champagne fairs, Genoese merchants participated in both sides of these trade flows. Geographically
distributed Tuscan merchant-banks, however, gradually displaced the Champagne fairs in the late 1200s.
3

Gras, Sapori

4

De Roover
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Beneath these fundamental innovations in business technique achieved by the
early Italian sedentary merchant-bankers of the 1200s (the so-called Dugento), I
maintain, laid the organizational invention of the corporation – not in its modern sense of
joint-stock ownership, but in its medieval sense of corporate body. Sedentary merchantbankers were still business partners in principal-agent alliance; but they also became
representatives of a collective enterprise with geographical spread, temporal depth, and
corporate liability.
The English word “corporation” is descended from the Latin corpus or body. In
the context of the Italian medieval company,5 the corpo was the starting capital
contributed by its founding partners (compagnie or soci). Operationally, corpo was used
to initiate a joint financial account (ragione sociale), in which the economic transactions
and financial obligations of all the partners were effected and registered. The ragione
sociale implemented in a practical way two organizational ideas: (a) unlimited liability of
the partners, and (b) corporate economic existence, above and beyond that of its
constitutive members.6 In medieval language, the rise of the “corporation” meant a move
from an alliance of companions or compagnie, with fluid partners, to the corporate body
of a società, with stationary branches or filiali. The legal form of the partnership contract
did not change, but there was a new sense and a new reality of continuity through time –
continuity through generational tine – that did not exist before.
Simple quantitative indicators of the phenomenon being discussed are the
numbers of partners and employees. In Champagne fairs of early 1200s, not really
‘corporations’ or societas, but just companies or compagnie… Merchant-banks of this
era, as will be demonstrated below, reached sizes of… Later partnership systems of the
Medici era involved numbers of partners in range…7 Hence the unitary merchant-banks
being discussed were the largest European economic organizations recorded in medieval
and Renaissance times.
5

The word “company”, in turn, descends from compagnie or companions. As I will explain later in this

paper, the organizational terms compagnia and società had elastic meanings in the Middle Ages, going well
beyond the domains of economic production and exchange.
6

Sapori on third parties.
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De Roover has some of these numbers in Medici book.
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This organizational invention of the corporation in its medieval sense, I hope to
demonstrate, was induced by the mobilization of the market, in the form of the
Champagne fairs, by the Catholic church for purposes of state finance – namely, to fund
its Italian ‘crusades’ against the Holy Roman Emperor. Religion bridged state and market
through war. Some crucial preliminary business techniques were invented in the fluidmerchant world of the Champagne fairs.8 But the basic organizational drive toward
sedentary filiali, I shall strive to demonstrate, was imprinted on the market by the visible
hand of the Church. On a practical level, landed church assets were spread all over
Europe, transcending the national boundaries of kingdoms. Asset dispersion in the
“universal church” required comparable geographical dispersion among the Church’s
financial agents. And on an ideological level, the fundamental Augustinian “two body”
conception of human community – living simultaneously on earth and on the way to
heaven – attempted to impose an impersonal office conception of organization onto the
deeply personalistic world of European feudalism. The mechanism of ideological
influence on economic organization was not prescriptive command, or even simpatico
mimesis. It was the dual functionality of private merchant and papal administrator – in
other words, being embedded in two worlds at once.
I shall call this mechanism of organizational invention “extension and
absorption.” On the side of the state, the market of private merchants (mercatores) was
administratively absorbed into the pope’s curia (in nostra camera) to make papal finance.
On the market side, partnerships of companions (compagnie) were extended to make
corporations (societas) in the form of private unitary merchant-banks, which operated in
and began to dominate9 international trade.
Working in church finance was only part of what the large Tuscan merchantbanks did. But this aspect of their activity altered, I shall argue, the trajectory of their
economic development. In their generative birth, large sedentary merchant-banks were
induced by the fusion of two institutions that preceded them – the Champagne fairs and
the Church.

8

In particular the idea and methods of procurator or agent. See Face (1957) and Berlow (1971).
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So much so that the Champagne fairs that spawned them were eventually driven out of business.
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In this chapter, I shall develop this thesis about the organizational invention of
medieval banks in the following stages: After this introduction, I shall present a very
brief literature review, just to place my thesis in historiographical context. Next, I state
my argument in “mechanisms of invention” terms compatible with the goals of this
volume. In a fourth section, I offer a macro-historical survey of the primary political and
economic events of this period – including both the rise of the Champagne fairs on the
‘purely economic’ front, and the Italian crusades or wars between the Pope and the Holy
Roman Emperor on the ‘purely political’ front. My co-evolutionary narrative seeks to
identify the intersection of these two streams of development, tracing consequences for
both state and market. In a fifth section, I present an organizational analysis of the
development of partnership structures among Italian merchant-bankers, as observed and
coded from the papal registers of 1243 to 1268. In a sixth section, I derive some
consequences of this organizational form for the evolution of the patrician family. The
conclusion will provide a brief coda.

2. Previous literature
There are quite a few specialist studies of particular companies and towns, mostly
written in languages other than English. Curiously, much of the intensive work of this
type was done early in the twentieth century, apparently now having gone out of favor, at
least outside of Italy. I shall utilize these valuable case studies in the fifth section below.
At the level of broad synthesis, there is not as much, with only a few authors
being heavily cited by everyone else. Being economic historians, these synthetic authors
explain the rise of merchant-banks through economic factors alone. Robert Lopez (1952,
1971) coined the term “Commercial Revolution.” The sweep of his vision was vast, but
he laid his emphasis on the traditional themes of trade opening to the east and the
consequent rise of the Champagne fairs, as well as on the theme of improvement in
agriculture. Genoa, Venice, and shipping loomed large in his account. Raymond de
Roover (1963), without exactly contradicting Lopez, laid his emphasis instead on the
‘internal’ development of superior business techniques. The Tuscan merchant-banks
became the culmination of the Commercial Revolution in de Roover’s focus, but the
Church and war were not part of his discussion. Peter Spufford (1988) is a monetarist
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who emphasized the discovery, in the late 1100s, of large volumes of silver in Germany
and to a lesser extent in Italy, outside of Siena. Spufford’s monetarist focus was fresh, but
it applies to a earlier period than the topic of this chapter. Without denying in any way
their importance to macroeconomic takeoff, agriculture, trade and silver are simply
assumed as background in this chapter. My focus instead is on organizational form.
Armando Sapori (1955, 1970), more than anyone else, has studied the large,
unitary merchant-banks that are the topic of this chapter. His work is the point of
departure for this chapter. Based on much close study, Sapori proposed that Italian
unitary merchant-banks emerged through three stages of development:10 First, according
to Sapori, companies were built on the basis of families. Second, family companies
reached out to recruit outside partners, in order to extend their startup capital (corpo).
Finally, family-plus-outsiders mobilized depositors, to extend their working capital (even
though that sopracorpo did not technically count as corpo). This simple developmental
scheme, driven by growth in capital, will provide a “null hypothesis” against which my
own alternative, more political, account can be evaluated.
In my own data on merchant-banks appearing in the papal registers of the mid
1200s, to be presented in section five below, I shall find problems with this
developmental scheme. It is not that I shall find no relationship between family and
company. But I shall find the causality reversed: instead of Sapori’s “company emerging
out of family,” I shall find rather “family emerging out of company.” The family-alliance
(consorteria) hypothesis of Blomquist11 I believe accurately describes the initial structure
of the mid-Dugento Tuscan merchant banks. From that beginning, family reproduction of
partners within the banks, through generational time, transformed merchant nuclear
families into magnate patrilineages. The relative dominance of a single ‘noble’ family
within the bank thereby grew. Challenging someone with the authority and depth of
knowledge of Sapori is not to be done lightly, but I shall report my findings and leave it
to future research to sort through any apparent contradictions.
This papal explanation for the birth of the Italian unitary merchant-bank is
original in the historiograophical literature, to the best of my knowledge.
10

Sapori (1970, pp. 45-49)

11

Blomquist ( , pp. )
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3. Mechanism of Organizational Invention: “Extension and Absorption”
Stated at an abstract level suitable for this comparative volume, the mechanism of
organizational invention I find illustrated by this Dugento Italian case is “extension and
absorption.” Namely, small and fluid organizational forms of partnership, originally
adapted to the Champagne-fair world of the market, were extended into the new domain
of state finance – first by the pope in the 1260s, and second by the English king in the
1270s – and then were absorbed (partially) into their respective state fiscal machineries.
Organizational invention ensued: Fluid and temporary partnerships evolved into
“corporations” (società), in the medieval sense of that word defined above. To repeat the
definition: (a) a unitary corpo and ragione sociale that outlived its contributing partners,
with (b) sedentary and more-or-less permanent geographical branches or filiali. Legally,
the partnership contract, with its implicit unlimited liability, was elastic enough12 to
absorb this fundamental change in organizational form, without requiring any change in
Roman law.13
In my previous research on Renaissance Florence, summarized and extended in
the next two chapters, I discovered two other multiple-network mechanisms for inventing
new forms of organization: namely, “transposition and refunctionality” and “robust
action.” All three of these organizational-invention mechanisms involve recombining
different types of pre-existing networks in new ways. Hybridity and multiple
functionality, achieved through various means, are common features across these three
mechanisms. “New ideas,” coming out of nowhere, are not.14

12

Indeed, as will be discussed below, “partnership” was an organizational concept that could be extended

to other than economic purposes – for example, military militias (societas militum), family alliances
(consorterie), and joint-ownership tower societies (società delle torri).
13

For an analogous elastic expansion, in nineteenth-century America, of the legal template of “commercial

contract” to cover the radically different meanings of merchant custom, ‘meeting of the wills,’ and
standardized obligations, see Horwitz (xxxx).
14

For this reason, I dismiss the concept of “genius” or “great man” as a scientific explanation, even if such

a person exists. The use of even tamer versions of such labels generally implies that the researcher has not
understood social context deeply enough to uncover the exact sequence of moves that were made.
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Innovation does not necessarily mean “it works.” To survive beyond an
antiquarian curiosity, any organizational innovation must first fit into, and be reproduced
by, the autocatalytic flows out of which it emerged. This is the meaning of “selection” in
an autocatalytic network context.15 If those flows themselves are altered, then the word
(systemic) invention is warranted, above and beyond just the word (organizational)
innovation. “Innovation” is a new form of organization or artifact. “Invention” is a
system tip induced by that innovation – a change in the selection regime that reproduces
that innovation.16 When, as in this case, there are two flows being combined – e.g.,
international trade flows, centered on the Champagne fairs, and state finance flows,
centered on popes and kings – then the dual-functionality innovation must be reproduced
by two (not necessarily consistent) flows at once. Innovation in banks would become
invention in banking17 if the emergence of the new organizational form of bank
transformed both the international-trade flows and the state-finance flows in which it
participated, in some way that reproduced that organizational form.
Dugento Tuscan merchant-banks qualify as an invention because they altered,
without interrupting, international trade flows. The geographical dispersion of sedentary
merchants in their interconnected filiali delivered luxury goods and textiles to (high end)
consumers more directly than did the traditional market of the Champagne fairs. The
Champagne fairs gradually declined in the late 1200s and early 1300s, inversely with the
rise of the sedentary merchants. This alteration in international trade flows did not occur
suddenly – first merchant trade at the Champagne fair declined in the late 1200s, but
currency exchange continued; only in the early 1300s did currency exchange itself at the
Champagne fairs decline, leading to the extinction of the fairs.
Dugento Tuscan merchant-banks also qualify as an invention because they
altered, without interrupting, state finance. Individual Italian bankers (campsores) gave
short-term loans to popes even before the rise of the large, unitary merchant-banks. With
the help of the newly emergent merchant-banks, however, popes and later the English

15

This meaning has more in common with the biologists’ conception of ‘fitness’ as relative reproduction

than it does with the economists’ conception of ‘fitness’ as relative performance.
16

Padgett and McLean (2006, pp. xxx).

17

I thank Walter Fontana for suggesting this terminology of banks versus banking.
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king could assemble money for their armies more quickly, taking loans from their Italian
bankers in anticipation of extraordinary tax assessments, which were collected slowly and
painfully. Merchant-bankers were repaid, with disguised interest, from these state
collections, as substantial tax revenues came in later. Because of this financial
arrangement, Italian merchant-banks became insinuated into the budding state-finance
administrative machineries of their sponsors.
The English king Edward I in the 1270s introduced a wrinkle into this loansagainst-future-taxes financial system, originally invented by the popes, which was to
have enormous consequences for the developing economy of Florence. Mercantilist
English law prohibited the export of precious metal from the kingdom, so loans to the
English king had to be repaid in raw wool, coming largely from monasteries. The
introduction of a new English customs system, with Italian merchant-bankers
participating in its administration, was the innovative solution for achieving this
repayment. Organizational innovation in papal banking redounded into organizational
invention in English state fiscal administration, which supported the original banking
innovation. The enormous consequence for the Florentine economy was the diversion of
high-quality English wool exports from their original destination of Flanders to the newly
developing textile industry of Florence. Florence thereby came to displace Flanders as the
primary center for wool-textile production in Europe.
With this new macroeconomic link between wool textiles and state finance came
high merchant profits to couple with enormous (but risky) banking profits. The large
unitary merchant-banks entered a self-sustaining “takeoff” phase, with steady merchant
business anchoring their highly volatile state-finance business.
A final autocatalytic flow involved people, not money. Originally, Italian bankers
were smallish money changers, often but not always Jewish, tainted with the odor of
usury. Participation in international trade could improve their social prestige from mere
domestic money changers to international merchant-bankers – a considerable climb in
social mobility, though still far below the rank of nobility. In the fluid stage of the early
1200s, traveling Italian merchants clustered abroad in expatriate communities and
neighborhoods called nazioni, with the permission of local potentates. Social bonds
within nazioni could become close – the social foundation for economic cooperation
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among overseas nationals – but in the early period local potentates did not grant
permission to stay in their territory for more than three or four months at a time.
With the mid-1200s rise of the large, unitary merchant-banks, however,
international merchant-bankers became associated with popes and kings. Such
legitimation and protection attracted substantial deposits from lay and clerical
aristocracies all over Europe. A ‘multiplier effect’ on the growth of capital thus kicked in,
a point that Sapori in particular has emphasized. My compatible point from a social
mobility perspective is such customers gave to successful leaders of large, unitary
merchant-banks a plausible claim for noble status for themselves.18 This is my finding of
“family coming out of company.” Successful bankers in unitary banks became noblemimicking patrilineages, through bringing sons and relatives into the bank, and through
purchasing property in their native city and in its countryside.19 This social consolidation
contributed to the longevity and ‘corporate’ character of the bank: company corpo
became part of family patrimony. It also integrated bankers into the ruling patriciate of
their city.
Once audacious claims by merchants to noble status were recognized by their
feudal peers, then a spillover occurred into Italian elite family structure. A subset of
Italian feudal nobility became more mercantile than their French, English and German
counterparts. In the tumultuous politics of the 1200s (to be described below), fragile
Italian communal elites had every incentive to reach out for sympathetic allies, as long as
the volume of such families was not too substantial. This process of gradual and highly
restricted20 social absorption reached point in Florence that merchant families like the
Bardi and the Cerchi were declared to be magnates in 1293, along with other “more
truly” feudal families.21

18

It was as if merchants were infeudated, like the soldiers were. Later in the absolutist period, this logic

develops into a “service nobility.” (Rosenberg, Mousnier)
19

Blomquist is particularly good at demonstrating these patrilineage spillovers, for the companies and

families of Lucca.
20

Restricted because there were not very many large unitary merchant banks.

21

This observation speaks to a long-standing debate in Florentine political historiography: Ottakar, etc.
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In sum, the Dugento mechanism of organizational invention was the pope
reaching into the Champagne fairs to extend and to absorb the international merchantbankers he found there. The unitary merchant-banks thereby created warrant the label
“invention”, not just “innovation”, because of the systemic spillovers they induced, which
reinforced the reproduction of these banks. These multiple-network systemic spillovers
included the following: (a) the deflection of international trade from the Champagne fairs
of the banks’ origin into themselves; (b) development of the capacity of state finance to
anticipate slow revenues; (c) creation of the English system of customs; (d) the growth of
the Florentine textile manufacturing industry; and (e) absorption of elite merchants into
noble family systems of patrilineage. This autocatalytic ensemble of multiple-network
flows made not just innovative banks, but a Commercial Revolution.

4. Macro-historical survey
Such at least is my causal interpretation, based on considerable reading.22 Now
what about evidence and ‘proof’? In this fourth section, I provide a macro-historical
survey of the wars and political context of the organizational development of the Tuscan
unitary merchant-banks. I provide new evidence from the papal registers dating the main
innovative “extension and absorption” intervention by pope Urban IV to 1262. In the next
fifth section, using both papal registers and existing case studies, I trace the ‘dependent
variable’ that responded to this papal intervention, as best I can with imperfect data –
namely, growth and transformation in the partnership and branch structures of Italian
merchant-banks.
(a) Champagne fairs
The seed out of which the Tuscan unitary merchant-banks grew were the shortterm partnerships and agency relations among the geographically fluid Italian merchants
who were participated in the Champagne fairs outside of Paris, and in nazioni expatriate
communities in England, in Flanders, and in other parts of France. The first documented
22

I have placed on my webpage lengthy extracts from the secondary literature and from the primary source

of published papal registers (in Latin). The interpretation offered in the previous section is my synthesis of
these various materials.
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“caravan merchants” to the Champagne fairs, in the 1190s, were from Arras in Flanders
and from Asti in the Italian Alps.23 By 1253, the Genoese had moved to a position of
dominance in this merchant trading and exchange business.24 Italian merchants moving
within the orbits of their nazioni and home towns developed short-term agency or “power
of attorney” relations25 with each other, in order to take care of each others’ business in
cities while they were absent. Mostly these delegation contracts were between merchants
from the same home town. Longer-term partnerships, to the extent they existed, were
often between brothers. The Genoese in particular, because of their sea trade, had the
capacity to extend these agency or procurator relations east to the Levant, as well as north
to Champagne.26
The Champagne fairs sprung into existence, probably in the mid 1100s, due to the
macroeconomic conjuncture of the development of trading routes to the Levant, the
discovery of silver in Germany, and the emergence of textile production in Flanders. In
its origins the Champagne fairs had nothing to do with state or papal finance.
(b) Crusades
Local feudal fighting was of course a constant during this period. But the really
big military actions were the Crusades. The “extension and absorption” intervention on
which I shall focus happened when the Crusades were diverted from their usual outward

23

Reynolds (1930).

24

According to Face (1969, p. 76): “Using as my criterion their appearance as principals in a contract

drawn on a fair of Champagne in the fourth volume of the unpublished cartulary of the Genoese notary
Bartholomeus de Fornarion for the year 1253, I have identified 278 individuals as belonging to that group
of merchants who dominated the trade between Genoa and Champagne in the middle of the thirteenth
century… Of these 278 individuals, 146 or approximately 52% are Genoese; 50 or approximately 12% are
Florentines; 21 are Sienese; 7 are from Lucca; 6 are from Parma; 4 are from Pistoia; and 3 are from
Cremona. In contrast there remain only 6 Asti men. To my knowledge there are no longer any men from
Arras in the group.” Of course, the fact that the source for this information was a Genoese notary may
inflate the estimated Genoese percentage somewhat.
25

More specifically, delegation contracts of procurator, nuncio or misso. See Face (1958). [See also article

in recalled Reg volume, once I see it.]
26

Face (1969) provides a colorful example.
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thrust toward Jerusalem back inward toward Italy itself – the so-called “Italian Crusades”
of the popes against the Holy Roman Empire in 1254-1302.27
Financing of the First Crusade (1096-99) was a decentralized affair of the
crusaders themselves, mostly feudal lords but also poor pilgrims, who mobilized their
own troops and funds.28 In the Second, Third, and Fourth Crusades (1147-49, 1187-92,
1202-04), kings started to exert more centralized control, starting in the Third Crusade
through levying special taxes mostly on the towns and on the church properties in their
reigns.29 The Fourth Crusade demonstrated the weakness of secular control from the
perspective of the Church: the crusaders and their Venetian shippers struck a private deal
to capture Constantinople instead of continuing on to conquer the Holy Land.
In the Fifth Crusade (1217-21), popes Innocent III and Honorius III started to
develop the fiscal administrative machinery necessary to exercise centralized papal
control. More-or-less standardized taxes on dispersed church properties were collected by
appointed papal nuncios and bureaucrats, rather than by local bishops alone.30 And the
Knights Templar, as early papal ‘bankers’,31 were used to move precious metals collected
from local churches and monasteries all over Europe to the East, there to be distributed
by papal legates, like Pelagius. Such centralized fiscal distribution blurred the line
between crusaders and mercenaries.
Many strides in papal fiscal administration thus were made, including within the
pope’s central office or camera (literally ‘bedroom’). Without these, the later Italian
merchant-banks would have had no one to work with. But the dramatic failure32 of the
Seventh Crusade (1248-54), led by an alliance between Pope Innocent IV and King/Saint
27

The narrative in this subsection draws heavily from Grossman (1965) and from Housley (1982). [Maybe

also Abulafia, once I get that book.]
28

Or else scavenged them en route.

29

The first general tax levy was called the Saladin Tithe, a precursor to national taxation. Nobles usually

escaped these levies on the ground of direct military participation, on the ground of paying someone to take
their place, or on the ground of simple refusal, the king not having enough power to coerce them.
30

Lunt ( ).

31

Bankers in quotes because only physical transport, no loans involved.

32

Including the Muslim capture and ransom of the French king, for an amount equivalent to an entire

year’s tax revenue in France.
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Louis IX of France, illustrated the weakness of even this improved system: neither slowly
assembled monies (i.e., precious metals) nor troops could be delivered in a timely and
coordinated fashion in emergency situations.
(c) Italian Crusades
Enter the Holy Roman Emperors – first the dashing Frederick II (1194-1250),
then his tough sons legitimate Conrad IV (1228-54) and illegitimate Manfred (1232-66),
then his adolescent grandson Conradin (1252-68). Through their inherited and wealthy
base in Sicily, as well as through their disorderly homeland in Germany, all of these
emperors aspired to making their grandiose but chimeral titles into reality. All that was
necessary was to take over the popes’ heartland of Italy, using a military squeeze play.
This was not an unattainable goal because all of Italy was militarily fractious at
the time – too busy fighting their neighbors to come together to defend ‘themselves’,
whatever that meant.33 Upon Frederick II’s revival of the pope-versus-emperor wars,34 all
these local feudal bands of Italian nobles/thugs clustered themselves into “Guelf” and
“Ghibelline” factions. Technically those labels meant “pro-pope” and “pro-emperor”
respectively, but these military bands of nobles remained concerned primarily about their
hostile neighbors. Hence they were not always reliable to their titular ‘leaders’.35 What
this meant for Frederick and for his opponent popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV was that
whenever any of them blew a whistle, they could assemble a hodgepodge of
unpredictable Italian noble militia to supplement whatever core troops they had. All this
made for a very combustible military situation in Italy throughout the 1200s.
Wars in Italy broke out repeatedly: between Frederick and Pope Gregory in 123741, between Frederick and Pope Innocent in 1246-48, and between Manfred and Pope
Innocent in 1254. With the Tuscan Ghibelline victory in 1260 in support of Manfred at
Montaperti (outside of Siena), the emperors’ dream of control over Italy seemed finally
within reach. Since 1232, the popes no longer even had a stable home in Rome: they fled
33

Waley (1969) is an especially good survey account of the politics and domestic warfare of the Italian

communes during this period. Jones ( ) is more learned, but also more costive.
34

The Investiture Controversy had been in 1075.

35

Famous theatre line: “enter stage right, Guelfs and Ghibellines fighting.”
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from one mountain top to another, in search of security and friends, all the while
frantically issuing papal bulls or commands that made it seem like their bureaucracy still
functioned.36 The popes were in very grave danger indeed, in spite of their administrative
reforms.
Overall, then, the Dugento presents to modern eyes a contradiction: on the
economic side, a budding “modernity” of trade, contracts and markets; on the military
side, a bewildering morass of feudal fighting at multiple scales, always with armies of
questionable loyalty. These were the raw social-network materials out of which the new
Tuscan merchant-banks were built.
(d) Pope Urban IV
Figure 1 presents data on the total number of papal bulls or commands issued per
year, from 1243 to 1268, as recorded in the papal registries of four consecutive midDugento popes (citations in bibliography). Figure 2 presents data on the subset of these
papal bulls mentioning Italian bankers.37 Figure 1 demonstrates a heavy papal workload –
medieval popes were busy people – whose temporal rhythms were tied to their successive
wars with the Holy Roman Emperor. Figure 2 shows that, while the first connections
between popes and Italian bankers certainly preceded Urban IV,38 it was only under the
reign of Urban IV that Italian bankers suddenly became actively organized into these
strenuous war efforts. One effect of this mobilization appears to be that the efficiency of
bull-issuing behavior by Urban IV skyrocketed to nearly 2000 in 1264, in preparation for
his upcoming war with Manfred. Even this unprecedented effort underestimates that
year’s amazing bull-production rate, since pope Urban died on September 11, 1264,
thereby depriving the time series of over three months of otherwise observable
behavior.39

36

Reading the bureaucratic formality of the papal registers while noticing the skittish movements of the

popes who issued these ‘commands’ makes for a somewhat poignant experience.
37

The complete list of these bulls, with verbatim extracts from each, is presented in a file entitled “Papal

Registers”, publicly available on my webpage: http://home.uchicago.edu/~jpadgett.
38

A fact to which I shall return below.

39

Was it possible that Pope Urban IV died of overwork?
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What led Urban IV strenuously to mobilize Italian bankers into his war-making
fiscal machinery? The problems that Italian merchant-bankers could solve, which the
Knights Templar could not, have already been mentioned: (a) transfer of money using
cambium contracts through their dispersed network of agents (rather than lugging
precious metal around on horses), and most important of all (b) loans, using capital raised
at the Champagne fairs. Italian bankers could solve the fiscal speed, and hence the
military coordination, problems that plagued tax extraction at that time.
Obviously these economic-efficiency advantages were fundamental for lock-in
and selection. They represented a major innovation in state finance. But this statement of
fiscal consequences is not enough to explain Urban IV’s act of innovation. Once the
Champagne fairs developed, other popes before Urban could have done the same thing.
Both motive and opportunity were there. But only Urban did it. Functionalist
explanations of consequence, however helpful for understanding selection, are not causal
explanations of genesis.
Urban’s predecessor, pope Alexander IV, had the major strategic idea, but
apparently was too administratively incompetent to pull it off. Namely, to preach
“crusade” against the “Anti-Christ” in Italy. The Jerusalem experience of generalized tax
levies on church properties (e.g., the decima) thereby came on line, and Italian Guelf
militias were catalyzed. Some complained that this was a perversion of the crusader
ideal.40 But for the popes of the time, this was a life-and-death matter.
Alexander’s specific and quite plausible idea was to preach this crusade in
England, where English king Henry III had previously expressed his interest to Innocent
IV in commuting Henry’s earlier ‘true’ crusader pledge to a “Sicilian Venture” that
allowed his second son Edmund to invade and to take over Sicily, instead of going off
himself to the Holy Land. In spite of Innocent’s intense struggle with Frederick, this
pious pope said to Henry: “No thanks, go off to the Holy Land.” Which Henry never did.
Pope Alexander, on the other hand, even though he was no less religious41 than
Innocent, decided to take Henry up on his offer after all. Taxes on English church
properties were raised for the venture, but tax collection was so slow, and English
40
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resistance so high, that enough money never could be assembled quickly enough. The
incomplete tax revenues ended up in who-knows-whose pockets. Eventually, this
‘illegitimate’ tax extraction led to the Barons’ Revolt in 1258, to the military defeat of
king Henry, and to the temporary loss of his power.42
Pope Urban took this failed idea of Alexander and made it French. He himself
was French in ethnicity, from Troyes in Champagne, not Italian like his predecessors.
And his previous job had been Patriarch of Jerusalem, in which capacity he was
intimately familiar with crusade finance. One result was that Charles of Anjou, brother of
King/Saint Louis IX, was chosen to be the pope’s champion, instead of Edmund of
England. “Crusade” against the Holy Roman Anti-Christ was launched using church
properties in France as the tax base, and the Champagne fairs as liquidity. Charles of
Anjou himself was to contribute nothing, except himself and his troops. A prince and
future king in name, but a mercenary in fact.
Presumably Urban became familiar with the merchant-banking techniques of the
Genoese while in his previous job. So why then did he choose the Tuscans and not the
Genoese to be his Italian merchant-bankers? Because his Tuscan merchant-bankers were
politically Guelf and the Genoese were not.43
Such was the sequence of moves, stretching over three popes, that led to Urban’s
administrative innovation. This innovation of Tuscan merchant-bankers as papal fiscal
agents locked in, however, because it worked decisively on the military battleground.
Urban never lived to see the culmination of his extraordinary efforts. But unlike the war
failures of Innocent and Alexander, the subsequent (also French) pope Clement IV and
his champion, Charles of Anjou, won a decisive battle in 1266 at Benevento over the
fearsome Manfred, killing him directly on the battlefield and seizing his treasure. Then
another decisive battle over the grandson Conradin in 1268 at Tagliacozzo eliminated
him as well. Major emergency loans by Tuscan merchant-bankers, against future tax
collections (with a profit of course), were essential in these mercenary victories. The
Hohenstaufen dynasty of the Holy Roman Empire thereby came to a permanent end, even
42
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though other papal wars of various sorts continued, eventually even with Charles of
Anjou.
As a subplot in these Italian crusades, Florence temporarily swung Ghibelline in
1260 after Montaperti, with many Florentine Guelf noble families becoming exiles, but
then back to Guelf in 1266 after Benevento, with many Florentine Ghibelline noble
families exiled. Civil war raged, with much of the city and its tower-houses physically
destroyed. Similar domestic upheaval occurred in Siena. Reverberations across levels of
analysis are common in this period.
(e) The English customs service
The final macro chapter in this political-economic story of banking invention is
the creation of the English custom service, which taxed the flow of English wool to
Flanders. This new service enabled new English king Edward I, Henry’s first son, to copy
pope Urban IV’s fiscal innovation and to transplant it to England. Italian merchantbankers were to be repaid in wool, because precious metals legally could be taken out of
the country by private citizens.
Curiously the diffusion of the basic idea to Edward also involved the crusades, a
great mixer and shaker in this period. While still a prince, Edward led the failed Ninth
‘true’ Crusade (1271-72) to the Holy Land, belatedly fulfilling his father’s pledge. During
his slow return, he dawdled for a year in Gascony, then under his own inheritance. Luke
Natale of Lucca, acting in the traditional role of transient banker/moneychanger for the
crusades, traveled with Edward during his perambulations and became close friends with
him. Luke already had been part of the networked Luchese nazione in England, out of
which the huge Ricciardi company of Lucca was soon to spring.44 I have no ‘smoking
gun’ quote to prove this, but I presume that Luke educated Edward about the virtues of
Urban IV’s recent innovations. Siena and Florence, after all, were not distant from Lucca;
and Tuscans mingled in their nazioni. For implementation in England, the only hitch was
that there needed to be a way to repay loans by the Italian merchant-bankers (like Luke
himself!). Since Lucca as a city was economically founded on silk manufacturing and
trading, the solution lay close at hand. The Luchese nazione in England already moved
44
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around textiles as a business, and was quite prepared to diversify its mercantile trade
from silk to wool. As were the Sienese and Florentine nazioni. Thus Urban IV’s
innovation diffused to England through the self-interested intermediation of the Tuscan
merchant-bankers themselves. They then implemented their own advice through linking
their respective nazioni to the king’s fiscal administration.
The English creation of the wool customs in 1275 was an enormous step toward
centralized monarchy. A new and centralized flow of tax revenues was made available to
the king, independent of Magna Carta type fiscal constraints, upon which the Barons’
Revolt had recently insisted. The serious financial-cum-political problems that Henry the
father had experienced were solved by Edward the son – with help from Italians, who had
implemented an originally French idea. Patent-law assumptions notwithstanding,
ownership of “inventions” becomes a bit distributed when systems tip.
Overall, my contention is that organizational invention in the ‘visible hand’ of the
market was rooted in state finance – or more precisely, in the linkage between
international trade and state finance.

5. Organizational evolution
In the appendix, I present four case studies in tabular form of the organizational
development and transactional activity of the largest banks from this period, plus one
cross-sectional snapshot for one year, 1263, of all of the banks absolved from
excommunication by pope Urban IV. The case studies are the Bonsignori company of
Siena, the Scali company of Florence, the Tolomei company of Siena, and the Ricciardi
company of Lucca. These tables array by year the data references that I have found to
these companies in multiple secondary sources and in two primary sources: the papal
registers of popes Innocent IV, Alexander IV, Urban IV, and Clement IV; and extracts
from the Liberate Rolls of the king of England, assembled by Bond (1839). The casestudy tables document both the origins and the explosive growth in the 1260s of the
Bonsignori, Scali, and Tolomei companies under the sponsorship of the popes (although
in the Tolomei case this growth was aborted). And they document the origins and the
explosive growth in the 1270s of the Ricciardi company under the sponsorship of king
Edward I of England.
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(a) Origins of case-study companies, and the failed English Sicilian venture
As far as my sources enable us to see them, most of the early partners in these
four large banks were drawn from the transient Italian merchant communities or nazioni
in Champagne and in England. They were then mobilized into cross-nazioni corporations
by the popes, or in the Ricciardi case by the king.
The largest early Tuscan bank was the Bonsignori company of Siena. One is
tempted to say that numerous famous later Florentine banks (e.g., Frescobaldi, Bardi,
Peruzzi) were modeled on this early template, except for the fact that many such banks
were born almost at the same time.45 The Bonsignori were the largest, the most favored,
and the most successful of the first generation unitary banks, not literally the first one.
The brothers Bonifacio di Bonsignore and Orlando di Bonsignore46 were bankers
(campsores) who operated in Genoa and Champagne.47 In 1252 Bonifacio first appears to
have been appointed official banker to the pope (campsor domini papae).48 Bonifacio’s
loans to the Church were not corporate in character, by which I mean that they were
offered by temporary syndicates of merchants, who reshuffled across transactions
through time.
In 1255 or 1256, however, this “di Bonsignore” partnership of brothers was
reorganized – throwing out leader Bonifacio and incorporating outsiders instead, the most
important of which was Bonaventura di Bernardino. The apparent reason for this
becomes clearer through the English Liberate Rolls. Bonaventura’s father, Bernardino di
Prosperino, had been active in loaning money to the king of England, for expenses and
the like, along with other Sienese resident in England. These loans were also not really
45

See the 1263 cross-section table in the appendix for a quasi “census”.

46

“di” in this context means “son of.” Such a name (“John son of Paul”), with no surname, connotes a non-

patrician status. Indeed the relative lack of wealth of the early Bonsignori was verified by Chiaudano ( ),
using early Sienese tax censuses.
47

Chiaudano on Genoa

48

English (1988, p. 12, footnote 8) thinks that Bonifacio’s appointment by Innocent IV was due to his past

link to the previous campsor domini papae of pope Gregory IX, Angelerio Solaficu from Siena. This is
quite plausible, but I could not verify that in the sources cited by English, and hence do not record
Angelerio in the Bonsignori table.

21
corporate in character, but were offered by syndicates of nazione merchants, who
reshuffled among themselves.49 The new non-family partnership between Orlando di
Bonsignore and Bonaventura di Bernardino (and others), in other words, was a
partnership connection between Champagne and England. We shall see similar crossgeographical links develop at the same time in the Scali company.
Why the timing of this? This is the period of the failed English Sicilian venture.
Pope Alexander IV gave to king Henry III of England permission to label as a “crusade”
Henry’s desire to send his second son Edmund to invade Sicily, thereby attacking the
Holy Roman Emperor. Alexander authorized the collection of crusade tithes on English
church property. As discussed above, ultimately this failed, leading to the Baron’s Revolt
in England. The point here is that this first triggering of the sedentary Bonsignori
‘corporation’ was due to Alexander’s early drive toward Italian-crusade papal finance.
In addition to internal English political constraints, a second reason for the failure
of this particular war mobilization effort was the personal passivity of Alexander in
directing this tax-collection effort (as indicated in figure 1). Alexander delegated the
collection of taxes on English church property to his hated50 legate, xxx. In sharp
contrast, pope Urban IV directed his own frantic tax-collection drive himself, sending out
orders all over France and Italy, but mainly France, in a much more centralized style.
While the details of the early formation of the Scali company are of course
different, the broad contour is similar. The core of the Scali company was not really the
della Scala family at all. Rather it was a clique of four Florentine merchants resident in
England – Amieri Cosa, Spigliato di Cambio, Rocco di Cambio, and Mainetto Spini.
These merchants had imported cloth into England since 1229, since the beginning of
Italian nazioni communities in England. These merchants also offered a variety of loans
49
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to the king from 1245 to 1254, in the reshuffling syndicate manner typical of the time –
one deal of which involved Jacobo della Scala.51
The alliance between this clique and the della Scala family took place in 1255
through 1257. In 1255, a large loan was given in Gascony to king Henry III’s first son
prince Edward (later to be king Edward I), in order to raise some troops.52 In 1256, a
substantial partnership in England crystallized to service the Sicilian venture. In 1257,
Jacobo’s son Cavalcante joined this new company on a permanent basis, thereby
contributing the company’s name.53
Syndicate loans directly to the English crown continued in 1258 and 1259, but in
1261 we see the massive entry of a greatly enlarged ‘Scali’ company into the pope’s own
service. This was the year that the Scali company was appointed campsores domini
papae, joining the Bonsignori company in this role.54 The appointment of this second
“favored banking company” was made by pope Alexander IV at the very end of his life,
probably in order to strengthen his (failed) financial connection to England. The
Bonsignori had restructured themselves to strengthen their own English connection, but
their economic roots remained primarily in France. The “Scali” however had been in
England from the Italian nazioni beginning.
The Tolomei company comes closest to fitting the Sapori model of “family plus
outsiders,” because of the extensive involvement of the patrician Tolomei family, mostly
in small loans to the city government. But even these various Tolomei family members
combined and recombined in their transactions in a fluid manner.
The Tolomei case is complicated, however, by the fact that when the pope first
mobilized them into papal finance, during the failed Sicilian venture, he actually
mobilized two companies of them. The first was the earlier family-dominated business.
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This set of partners moved for a few years into papal finance, but then dropped out and
went back to wool trading. The second apparently new company, the Scotti-Tolomei
company, was an alliance between three of the Tolomei with numerous other Sienese,
including four of the Scotti. This second company was appointed official campsores
domini papae by Alexander late in his life. This second company also did not stay long in
papal finance. Urban launched an investigation into its financial performance, which
apparently was not satisfactory.55 The first Tolomei was called in to broker a compromise
between pope Urban and the Scotti-Tolomei. While the first Tolomei company escaped
blame in the matter, neither company figured as major papal bankers again.
I do not have much partnership data over time on the Scotti-Tolomei. But the fact
that the regular Tolomei, when they dropped back to normal wool merchants, also
dropped back to shifting partnership patterns, is the exception that proves the rule.
My fourth and final case study of the Ricciardi company shows how the popes’
financial innovation worked when it was transposed ten years later to England by the
finally new56 king Edward I. King Edward made an important extension to this statefinance system of enormous consequence for the wool industry in Florence: the
introduction of a wool customs, to pay back Tuscan bankers’ loans to the English king.
The first page of the Ricciardi table in the appendix, which takes us through 1266,
demonstrates that originally there were two almost completely distinct sets of Lucchese
merchants, who later combined into the unified Ricciardi company: one set operating in
Lucca, the other set operating in England. The Lucchese merchants in Lucca were
manufacturing fine silk cloth The Lucchese merchants in England were selling that silk
cloth to wealthy clients, including to king Henry III himself. The “Ricciardi” name
descended from Lucca half of this cooperation – in particular, from one Ricciardo di
Graziano di Ricciardo, a silk dyer or tintor. Each of these two geographically distinct
subsets of merchants demonstrated considerable fluidity in their partnerships – namely,
partnerships formed and re-formed among merchants within these two locations over
time. The “almost” part of the first sentence in this paragraph refers to the one exception
of Peregrino Sesmundi, who in 1241 apparently moved from Lucca to England, thereby
55
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creating the only partnership “bridge” in these early data between these two subsets of
merchants.
Based on these data, previous historians have assumed that an integrated Ricciardi
company existed in the 1240s and 1250s, with one branch making silk and the other
branch selling silk. In my opinion, this reads history backward: inferring early structure
from what followed. No doubt there were cooperative exchange relations existing
between these two complementary halves of the supply chain. But I don’t see the
historical data, such as it is,57 as demonstrating anything more than regularized
cooperation.
The Ricciardi company exploded in partnership size, however, in the 1270s, with
geographical branches appearing not only in England, but also in Ireland and Paris. The
original Lucca silk-manufacturing branch recedes from sight in the sources, but an
extensive partnership list in 1286 leads to the presumption that the silk-manufacturing
‘home office’ was still there, in the misty background. The Lucca branch itself was
overshadowed by the transformation of the Ricciardi company into the primary bankers
of the English king. As a consequence, the most important partner of the company was no
longer one of the Ricciardi family, but rather Lucasio Natale (Luke of Luka in English
sources), the personal banker and friend of king Edward I.
Judging from timing, the triggering event in this transformation of the Ricciardi
company appears to be loans58 given to the still prince Edward in Genoa in 1272 during
his leisurely return to England from his failed Ninth Crusade. Lucasio Natale had
accompanied Edward throughout his crusade, such travels building upon the earlier social
and business ties established between his compatriots and king Henry III, in their roles as
personalized silk salesmen.59 It seems plausible to assume from their speed of
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implementation, immediately after Edward’s November 1272 accession to the throne,
that the financial innovations by Edward – namely, to appoint the Ricciardi company as
favored state financiers, and to make wool customs the mechanism of repayment – was
rooted in these travel conversations and these loans between Lucasio and prince Edward.
Through nazioni linkages with other Tuscan bankers abroad, Lucasio would have been
well informed about the contemporary financial innovations made by his Sienese and
Florentine colleagues. If this speculation is correct, then Tuscan bankers were not only
the beneficiaries but also the (self-interested) authors of innovation in English state
finance, at least in part.
Tuscan bankers in general, and the Ricciardi company in particular, benefited
greatly in trade from their increased control over the flow of English wool exports in
repayment for their loans to the English king. In 1273, 24.4% of all licensed wool exports
from England were in the hands of Tuscan companies. The distribution of wool export
trade in that year was as follows:60
Scotti of Piacenza
Riccardi of Lucca
Frescobaldi of Florence
Bardi of Florence
Nicholas Testa of Lucca
Macci of Florence
Falconieri of Florence
Cerchi of Florence

2140 sacks
1080 sacks
880 sacks
700 sacks
700 sacks
640 sacks
620 sacks
400 sacks

Twenty years later in 1294, a crisis year, the wool exports in the hands of Tuscan
companies that were seized by the king were as follows:61
Riccardi of Lucca
Frescobaldi of Florence
Cerchi Neri of Florence
Cerchi Bianchi of Florence
Mozzi of Florence
Pulci of Florence
Frescobaldi Neri of Florence

412 sacks
360 sacks
350 sacks
301 sacks
261 sacks
257.5 sacks
154 sacks

Orlando Bonsignori, pope Innocent IV’s favorite banker, slept in the pope’s bedroom, though not I assume
in the pope’s bed.
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Spini of Florence
Bardi of Florence
Bettori of Lucca

153.5 sacks
99 sacks
35 sacks.

These English wool-export lists give a hint of the growth in numbers of Tuscan
unitary merchant-banks during the second half of the Dugento, after the initiating events
analyzed here.62
(b) Pope Urban IV and the corporate organizational form
Before he was elected pope in 1261, Urban IV was Jacques Pantaléon of Troyes.
Troyes was the largest of the four towns that comprised the Champagne fairs. Urban IV,
in other words, was from the Champagne fairs. Speaking a bit metaphorically Urban IV
was himself the incorporation of the fairs into the papacy. Speaking less metaphorically,
he knew how they worked. This knowledge was used and polished by his appointment in
1255 as Patriarch of Jerusalem, shortly after the disaster of the failed Seventh crusade.63
Rather than being an insular man of Rome,64 Urban IV was a man comfortable in the
extended trading and military networks of medieval Europe.
In figure 1, we have already seen evidence of Urban IV’s capacity for hard work.
Most of this work involved the financing of Charles of Anjou’s army for war against
Manfred. Urban IV did not delegate like Alexander IV; he took charge personally.
Looking a bit more into the details of figure 2 reveals an interesting wrinkle in Urban’s
mobilization of Italian bankers. At first, pope Urban IV relied heavily on the Bonsignori
company, which he had inherited from his predecessors. The switch from projected
English troops to projected French troops, after all, actually played to Bonsignori
strengths. In 1264 at the very peak of Urban IV’s frenzy, however, he dropped the
Bonsignori company entirely, relying instead on a diversified range of other banks. One
long-term consequence of this shift in centralized papal strategy was to propel the
62

A longer list of sixteen Tuscan firms active in England, from 1283, is provided in Lunt (1939), appendix

VI, pp. 641-665. Blomquist (1971), pp. 173-178, provides a valuable comprehensive list of export-oriented
companies in Lucca in 1284, which includes more than companies involved in English trade.
63

This was the crusade where the army of King/Saint Louis IX was defeated in Egypt. He was captured and

ransomed for about one year’s revenues of the entire kingdom of France.
64

Indeed as I mentioned above, he was too much on the run ever to reside in Rome.

27
diffusion of the corporate organizational form beyond a few papal favorites out into the
market at large.
What lay behind Urban’s sudden shift towards diversification? I suggest that
Urban IV’s tactical approach in 1264 was not inconsistent with the Champagne fair
experience of Jacques Pantaléon – except that the companies involved now emerged at a
vastly larger scale and scope than before, with permanent branches instead of fluid
partnerships. Urban IV from Champagne was using the market logic of Champagne to
mobilize for war.65
Reasonable as this is as a cognitively predisposing factor, Edward English has
discovered that Urban had more on his mind than efficient market logic when he chose
his bankers. The Guelfs and the Ghibellines of Siena and Florence had just had their
battle of Montaperti in 1260, resulting in Ghibelline victory and in the installation of proEmperor regimes in both Siena and Florence. This was the battle that led to the nadir of
the popes’ fortunes in Italy. Urban was basically surrounded by his enemies. His strategy
for counter-attack was to excommunicate both cities,66 but also to target with absolution
particular lists of Guelf allies and potential allies. Foremost among these absolution lists
were companies of merchants and companies of soldiers.67 These lists are the source of
the 1263 quasi-census of internationally oriented Florentine and Sienese companies
presented in the appendix. It is worth noting that most of the new companies in this 1263
list are Florentine, not Sienese. Not all of the companies absolved in 1263 were
ultimately used for papal finance in 1264 (at least in the data I coded), but many of them
were. This may be the first intimation of a gradual takeover of papal business by the
Florentines. If so, it places the politics of Guelf versus Ghibelline at the center of the
explanation of the economic victory of Florence over Siena in the late Dugento.68

65

Padgett and McLean (2006) call such examples of “old tool for new purpose” as the organizational-

invention mechanism of “transposition and refunctionality.” Lewontin and Gould ( ) called it “exaptation.”
Padgett and Ansell (1993) argued that Cosimo de’ Medici did something similar.
66

Bull #:

67

For merchant companies, bull #s:… For soldier companies, bull #:

68

But I do not deny the also crucial importance of the developing Florentine wool industry in this economic

victory. (Goldthwaite’s new book)

28
There was a political logic involved in the diversification of banks, in other
words, as well as a market logic. Not only the original Bonsignori and Scali companies
but also most of the Guelf-inclined international bankers in Siena and Florence were
mobilized into Urban’s ‘crusade’ against Manfred. This in opposition to the regimes of
their own cities.69 Papal oil was thrown on the fires of Tuscan civil wars. When Charles
of Anjou finally defeated Manfred in 1266, previously exiled Sienese and Florentine
Guelfs triumphantly returned to their cities, exiled ruling Ghibellines in their turn, and
destroyed their tower-houses. Powerful noble Ghibelline families70 fled to the hills and to
friendlier cities, bitterly plotting their revenge and giving Dante much to write about.
The aspect of this story that interests us here is the organizational consequence of
this successful mobilization, both political and economic, of Tuscan bankers for Italian
crusade. Corporate organizational form, in the medieval sense of that term, is evident in
the four case-study tables in the appendix in the following ways:
1. Branches are indicated by the geographical clustering of different non-director
partners (soci in the documents) into specialized transaction locations.71
2. In contrast, director-partners are characterized by geographical diversity, as
they write ‘home office’ letters to their branches.
3. Director-partner roles and non-director-partner roles are distinguished
linguistically in the papal-bull documents.72 In the appendix this linguistic
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differentiation of roles is indicated by underlining the bull number in which
such language appears. [give actual language and first dates for my cases]
4. Soon after the 1260s the highly corporate language of “societas” or society –
as in “Societas Ricciardorum” – will appear in documents, to refer to unitary
companies of merchant-bankers.73 In the origin period of the 1260s examined
here, that word had not yet become routinized in the papal bulls.74 Criterion
#3 language was more commonly used instead. Lack of standardization in
language is yet another indicator of the new nature of this organizational form.
I have demonstrated a very close temporal connection between the emergence of
the corporate organizational form in Tuscan banking and financial mobilization by the
popes in their Italian crusades against the Holy Roman Emperors. It seems clear that
finance for the ‘state’ became linked to the ‘market’ of the Champagne fairs. For where,
after all, did the Tuscan bankers get their monies for loans to the pope, and later the
English king, in the first place? From the fairs.
I want to close this section by speculating about why the corporate organizational
form in particular? Different aspects of this form were connected to different aspects of
bankers’ connection with the pope. “Large” seems induced by the magnitude of the
extraordinary crusade taxes on Church properties, under the constraint that only a few
favored banks were selected for the job. “Geographically dispersed” seems induced by
the geographical dispersion of those Church assets. Loan money could be raised centrally
in Champagne, but repayment was scattered all over Europe. These two demographic
aspects lead us toward, but not quite all the way to the concept of “corporate.”
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An example would be “Andree Jacobi, Facio Juncte et Bonsignori Raynerii, sociis delectorum filiorum

Rolandi Bonsignoris, Bonaventura Bernardini et Raynerii Jacobi, civium et mercatorum Senensium,
campsorum camere nostre...” (Registres d’Urbain IV, 2, n. 9.) Here Andrea di Jacopo, Facio di Giunte and
Bonsignore di Raineri were carrying out in France a financial order issued by Urban IV, in the name of
their company directors Orlandino di Bonsignore, Bonaventura di Bernardino and Raineri di Jacopo.
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This contrasts with the prior, and possibly more fluid, language of soci or partners.
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30
Corporate in the medieval sense meant body, in particular collective body, as in
“body of Christ.”75 This in turn meant the continuity of the organization beyond the
participatory contributions of its members – as in procession, hopefully all the way to
heaven.76 In the less rarified terms of practical economics, Catholic ‘corporate body’
implied two things: (a) the recruitment by partners of sons and kinsmen to carry on the
company after they died, and (b) the joint liability by all in the societas to debts incurred
by any of the partners.77 In the next section, I see if the data fits the first of these
implications. There I develop my hypothesis about “family out of company,” rather than
“company out of family.”
The one final, and perhaps most crucial, feature of the Dugento Tuscan
organizational form was “sedentary merchants doing written business through letters.”
Where might Tuscan bankers have gotten this idea? To whose letters are they
responding? What is my papal register data, after all? Even though I have never seen this
suggestion in the literature, it does not seem so outlandish to suggest that Tuscan unitary
bankers absorbed a secular version of church organization into themselves when they
became agents of, indeed when they became part of, the papal camera. They began to
write business letters to their branch offices, just like the pope wrote letters to his
geographically dispersed agents, which now included them.
Medieval ‘agency’ in part was incorporation. Papal bulls from the pope to
Bonaventura Bernardini and Francesco Guidi, ‘agents’ of the Bonsignori company
‘assigned’ to the pope,78 read like virtual letters of endearment.79 “My dearest son”
language is everywhere, formalized but also apparently sincere. The arms-length and
modernist language of ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ hardly seems capable of capturing the
interactional meaning of medieval ‘business’ relations.80
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Cf. Kantorowicz.
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Duby talks about church life in general and the crusades in particular as procession.
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Sapori on unlimited liability to third parties.
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Or were they ‘agents’ of the pope, ‘assigned’ to the Bonsignori company?
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Paul’s book.
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The “origin of banking” framing of most economic historiography on unitary
merchant-banks is modernist in that it looks to explain economic consequences by
economic causes. I too am interested in explaining organizational genesis. But I insist
that the social contexts of inventions be taken seriously, for these are the raw materials
being recombined into invention. Multi-functionality and spillover are rife in social
invention processes, in part because of objective turmoil, but also in part because other
times and places may not parse “the economic,” “the political,” and “the social” as we do.
Scientific explanation requires historical sensitivity.81

6. Family out of company
Church documents in the 1200s were in Latin. Hence second names ending in “i”
usually implied the ablative “of” – for example, “Franciscus Guidi” meant “Francis son
of Guido.” Because of this medieval method of naming, kinship relations can be inferred
from names. With two names strung together to make a person, one can infer the nuclearfamily kinship relations of brother and father,82 but not that of cousin. With three names
strung together in ablative form, first cousins can be identified. As ablatives evolved into
surnames,83 more distant ‘clan’ relations can be inferred from common surname.
Patricians or nobles in the Dugento often added a “de” to their last names. Hence both
kinship and social status can be inferred directly from names – a fact of course that was
no accident to the people involved.
According to the documents that I saw, when Sapori referred to the first stage of
unitary company development being “family”, he must have been referring to nuclear
family. Non-noble persons, with only ablative names, overwhelmingly predominated in
the Dugento partnership lists, even though noble family names do occasionally appear.
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It would take me too far afield to develop this point, but I am arguing here for a processual or

‘mechanism’ view of science (Elster), rather than an input-output ‘covering law’ view of science. This
processual view makes much of the usually assumed contradiction between history and science go away.
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Although not without some chance of error in those cases where two unrelated persons had fathers with

the same firs name.
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Three names strung together implies self-consciousness of lineage, at least at the common grandfather

level. As such self-consciousness of lineage develops, grandchildren and beyond can turn their ablative
ancestor name “of Guido” into a new surname for themselves of “Guidi”. See Padgett 2009.
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Interestingly, however, the overall company name, once it developed, frequently referred
to the noble member of the partnership, even though that member may not have been the
true economic leader.84 An example discussed above is the Scali company – named after
Jacobus de Scala, even though that company was founded and led primarily by a clique
of four non-patrician merchants in the Florentine nazione in England. Using the family
name of the company to infer the “family foundation” of the company, therefore, can be a
surprisingly precarious enterprise, at least for the mid-Dugento.
In this section I shall measure kinship connections among partners directly. I shall
find that Blomquist’s consorteria hypothesis fits the cross-sectional partnership data of
the mid-Dugento better than does Sapori’s more famous “core family plus outsiders”
hypothesis. Viewed over time, Sapori’s “company out of family” portrait makes sense as
long as the word “family” is constrained to non-noble nuclear families. This caveat is not
commonly observed in the literature, wherein the family name of the company is usually
what is referenced. When the word “family” means patrilineage, I find that the image of
“family out of company” fits the data better, with merchant nuclear families growing into
patrician patrilineages if the unitary company succeeded.
Summary statistics about kinship relations among the partners of the companies
whose excommunication pope Urban IV had absolved in 1263-64, and pope Clement IV
absolved in 1265, are as follows:85
proportion partners in largest-family (nuclear or otherwise) subset of partners
= (Σi # largest family subseti) / (Σi # partnersi)
= 71 / 197 = .360
proportion partners in any-family (nuclear or otherwise) subset of partners
= (Σi # partners with any kin as partnersi) / (Σi # partnersi)
= 124 / 197 = .629.
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“Leader” in this sentence is defined in terms of the transactional behavior documented in the appendix.

As I have said numerous times, no partnership contracts survive from this period; these would have listed
the startup-capital investment of the various partners. It is possible, indeed likely, that noble families
contributed more than their fair share of the corpo, even if they were passive investors.
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Readers are free of course to look in the appendix at the particular companies comprising these aggregate

statistics. I included all absolved companies, including the Bonsignori, Scali and Tolomei, in the statistics.
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Small companies with four or fewer partners do not really fit my unitary-bank definition.
If these are excluded, then the kinship proportions shrink to .297 and .600,86 respectively.
The connection between kinship and unitary merchant-banks therefore was high.
But this connection was not just a single family per company. Within these companies
there were about as many partners in kinship relations outside of the largest kin group as
there were partners within the largest kinship group. If Dugento companies are to be
described as “family plus outsiders,” then it must be understood that “outsiders” had
many family relations among themselves. Indeed simple inspection of the lists shows that
Dugento unitary companies were alliances of families – not alliances of noble patrilineal
families, like the military tower societies,87 but alliances of merchant nuclear families.
Blomquist has noticed this already, with regard to the Ricciardi company:
“Despite its legal status as a simple partnership, the Ricciardi enterprise appears
to have been similar functionally to the consortial organizations into which the
families of the Lucchese urban elite commonly banded together. I am suggesting
here that the large-scale international societas differed from a consortium (in
Lucca called consortatus) only in that its purpose was to engage in commerce and
finance rather than to provide political and [military] refuge for its members.”
(1980, p. 18)
One further documentary example confirms directly this Dugento parallel
between societas and consorteria. The absolution for the (regular) Tolomei company of
Siena appeared in a long list88 of other Sienese “companies”, most of whom were
composed of socii nobilium – a term that did not appear otherwise in my extract of papal
bulls about Italian merchant-banks. Comparison with another bull89 to the exiled Guelf
militia of Siena in 1263 confirms the impression that the first list was a list of soldier
companies, not of merchant companies. The Tolomei company was apparently both a
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The exact ratios are (52 / 175), and (105 / 175).
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Santini (1887); Waley (1969), p.
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Registre d’Urbain IV, 2, n. 175 (5 January 1263).
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Registre d’Urbain IV, 2, n. 274 (6 March 1263).
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merchant company and a soldier company at the same time,90 probably because the
family in question was noble.
Medieval Italian documents from the 1200s refer to societas militum,91 which
were noble families or alliances of noble families organized into cavalry bands.
City militias were alliances of such bands.92 The Tuscan civil wars of the 1260s between
Guelfs and Ghibellines were carried out by societates of noble soldiers from Florence and
Siena. The Tuscan financial mobilization of the 1260s by Urban IV, as we have seen, was
carried out by societates of mostly non-noble merchants from Florence and Siena.
Urban’s purpose in absolving the merchant companies from his excommunication of their
fellow citizens was to mobilize them93 for war – specifically for his ‘religious’ crusade
against Manfred – which he successfully did. This intertwining of military with economic
with religious organization, all in the name of crusade, can’t get much more intimate than
this. With crusade the pope spanned deep social-class divisions within Tuscan cities,94
and united pro-pope but fractious social segments in Florence, Siena and Lucca into
“Guelf.”
In their genesis, unitary merchant-banking companies in Tuscany were thus the
economic wing of a holy army that the pope built for his Italian crusade. Diversification
of one favored merchant company into a state-finance “market” paralleled the assembly
of noble military companies into a feudal militia. The family-alliance or consorteria
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[confirmation in Mucciarelli?] [also mention Katalin’s point about Scolari]
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Waley (1969), pp. 166, 183.
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Waley (1969, p. 83): “Joint inheritance might cause the obligation to fall on a number of co-heirs,

particularly at a time when there had been no recent review of cavalry service: those owing it would then
have to provide a cavalryman between them. This must considerably have complicated the task of
organizing the militia, for nearly two-thirds of the Florentine horses recorded in the Libro di Montaperti
(1260) were owed jointly by consortes.” Waley (1969, p. 135): “The approximate numbers of Florentine
cavalrymen engaged in the four great battles of 1260 to 1325 are as follows: 1260 (Montaperti) 1,400.”
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I have not the space to go deeply into these social-class cleavages, but they were deep. In 1250, for

example, the Florentine non-noble Popolo rose up militarily, on their organizational foundation of guilds,
to make a ten-year interlude of republican government. This lasted until the Ghibelline victory at the battle
of Montaperti in 1260.
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nature of the internal partnership structure of unitary banks in part reflected these
militaristic origins.
“Corporate” in the medieval sense implied collective continuity through time.
One hypothesized implication for economic organization is that partners of corporate
companies should recruit their sons to replace them, to carry on their successful business
after they died. To test this hypothesis, one needs lists of partners over generational time.
In my 1260s case, this means lists of the partners into at least the 1280s. With only three
case studies that do this, my conclusions about this hypothesis can only be suggestive.
Nonetheless, for what they are worth: (1) five of the twenty-three partners in the
Bonsignori company of 1289 were descendants of Bonsignori company partners in the
previous generation;95 (2) eight of the sixteen partners of the Scali company of 1282 and
1284 were descendants of Scali company partners in the previous generation;96 (3) five of
the seventeen partners of the Ricciardi company of 1286 were descendants of Ricciardi
partners in the previous generation.97 Are these numbers high? I have no baseline model
against which to evaluate statistically these numbers. But they at least are consistent with
the “sons replace fathers” continuity hypothesis. As telling as anything is the obvious fact
that these three companies (and quite a few others) reproduced their organizational
survival over decades in the first place. The fluid partnerships and syndicates of the
Italian merchants in overseas nazioni before the 1260s did not do this. The ‘Scali’ as a
company, for example, survived over generations; and the partners comprising it
biologically reproduced as partners as well. In the future, I hope to continue my coding of
the Papal Registers, in order to increase the number of merchant-banks with which to
evaluate further this hypothesis.
Blomquist provides evidence about a yet third kinship aspect of ‘corporate’ on
which I have no data. In my relational dataset on Trecento and Quattrocento Florence, I
have rich quantitative information on the marriage, economic and political networks of
Florentines.98 I have no such network-contextual information on Dugento Florence. But
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Four were the same people, and hence should not count in the denominator.
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in his archivally rich case study99 of the Ricciardi and the Guidiccioni families of Lucca,
who allied to make the Ricciardi company, Blomquist unearthed considerable
information about the marriages, property purchases, and neighbors of members of these
two families. Those data demonstrate something that I cannot – namely, that many of
even the “non-kinship outsiders” partners in the company were linked to the dominant
two families by marriage or by other means.
“The evidence at hand seems sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the
Ricciardi Company was in fact a long term alliance for commercial ends between
families descending from the early partners in the enterprise, an alliance that was
augmented by recruiting new members from other families which were through
blood, marriage, consortial or neighborhood ties already linked to the group. I
would assume that admission to partnership status of an individual lacking these
ties must have been rare.” (1980, p. 18)
Much of the analysis in this section extends and confirms this superb but unfortunately
obscure case study by Blomquist.
All these pieces about kinship add up to my section conclusion: Successful
leadership of unitary merchant-banks transformed merchant nuclear families into noble
patrilineages. That is, “family out of company.” This unitary-bank channel of social
mobility was very restricted compared to the republican channels of the Renaissance.100
But the consequence when it happened was the same: the diffusion of corporate versions
of “the family”, from the nobility down to mimicking merchants, in the form of
patrilineage. Again, Blomquist’s rich case-study of the Ricciardi and the Guidiccioni of
Lucca provides details that my study cannot – namely, the purchase and construction of
large blocks of real estate, both in the heart of the city (tower houses) and in those areas
of the countryside or contado from which the family had immigrated. Profits from the
bank provided the money for these real estate purchases. But other Florentine banking
families apparently made the same social-mobility journey – namely, descendents of
Spigliatus and Rustichellus Cambii turned into the Mozzi, descendents of Manetto Spine
turned into the Spini, descendents of Bonaguide Bardi turned into the Bardi, descendents
99

Blomquist (1980, 1982).
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Cf. Padgett (1980).
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of Circulus Oliverii Circuli turned into the Cerchi, and descendents of Lambertus
Fruscobaldi turned into the Frescobaldi. These family names are prominent as companies
in the English wool-export lists reported above. But they are also prominent on the 1293
list of Florentine magnates declared to be legally excluded from ever holding public
office in the future.101 This magnate category was created by a ‘populist’ revolt against
patricians.102 How quickly successful unitary-bank families of the 1260s took on a noble
behavior that made them hated in populist eyes!103
To close this section, I want to emphasize the common consortial logic of many
forms of Dugento social organization – in the domain of economics, in the domain of
military, in the domain of real estate, and in the domain of family. To try too hard to
distinguish whether a family name referred to a patrilineage or to a unitary company
ignores the consortial logic of both. Family was property, at least in the patrilineage sense
of family. And property was family, at least in the patrimony sense of corpo. We are very
far away from kinship concepts like romance.
“Transpositions and refunctionalities”104 and “extensions and absorptions” were
everywhere in the organizations of the 1200s. This is a social-science way of saying that
the linked concepts of societas and consorteria105 were plastic social-organizational tools
of the Dugento, capable of mobilization for a variety of purposes. All sorts of micromotivations underlay the construction of particular such organizations – profit, war,
social mobility. But both actively and passively, the Church stood behind them all,
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middle-class guilds.
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This point about nobility through unitary banks helps to make sense of a puzzle in the political history of

Florence – how merchants could have gotten onto a list of feudal magnates, in the eyes of contemporary
popolani. (Ottakar debate)
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Kent (1977) has emphasized that in the Renaissance the word “consorteria” came to be more restricted to
mean “patrilineage” itself. The earlier Dugento meaning of “family alliance” had faded away, along with
the reality of that form of social organization. Most likely the one main reason for this fade was the
emergence of the republic, which undercut the military function of patrilineage.
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sending these motivations down particular organizational trajectories. Dugento
organizational inventions were secular recombinations of social relations and concepts in
a fundamentally religious tool-kit of practices.106

7. Conclusion
If the Tuscan unitary merchant-banks were born because of the pope, they
survived because of the king of England. Repayment through the customs service turned
wool into simultaneously a commodity in international trade and a commodity in state
finance. Wool had to be manufactured into textiles both for merchants to make their
profit and for the king to make his soldiers. As sedentary merchant-banks expanded, the
Florence wool textile industry grew and the Champagne fairs declined.
This autocatalytic trajectory lasted until the famous bankruptcies of the Bardi and
the Peruzzi companies in Florence in 1342. In truth, this trading system had been in
decline since the turn of the century. The Bonsignori company went bankrupt in 129x.
The Ricciardi went bankrupt in 130x. The Scali went bankrupt in 130x. The Frescobaldi
went bankrupt in 131x. My data from the Florentine banking guild’s annual registration
of banks traces a grim picture of steady decline from 1299 onwards: …
Basically these declines were due to a series of wars between the king of England
and the king of France. Secular wars between France and England were not as profitable
for Tuscan merchant-banks as were the ‘holy’ crusades in the peninsula of Italy. The
reason for this difference is related directly to the flow of wool, which passed through
France. The Italian crusades and the fiscal reforms of Edward I had fueled that flow, but
subsequent wars with France by Edwards II and III had disrupted it. The king of France
never adopted the innovative state-finance methods of pope Urban IV. King Philip the
Fair of France attacked England in part by jailing Italian merchants resident in France and
confiscating their goods. In the name of usury. The kings of England in their turn, with
their smooth state finance failing, short-sightedly also jailed their own bankers and
confiscated their goods.107 In spite of his questionable credit rating, for a while one
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Tuscan banker replaced another in the king’s service: the Ricciardi company was
followed by the Frescobaldi company, which was followed by the Bardi company.
Eventually profits in the wool trade were not sufficient to offset their shabby royal
treatment. At end Bardi were owed by Edward III the equivalent of an entire year’s
English production in wool [check this figure] Edward wouldn’t pay it, and the
organizational invention whose birth has been analyzed in this chapter became extinct.
Busts following booms have been with us in history for a long time.
Ultimate extinction notwithstanding, the Tuscan unitary merchant bank was an
amazing invention, especially for its time. Bills of exchange and account books changed
banking forever, and the Commercial Revolution moved Europe out of its economic
backwater. Dare I utter that historiographically out-of-fashion sentiment that the Middle
Ages ended?108
For us as social scientists, the lessons are “extension and absorption” as another
multiple-network folding mechanism for organizational genesis, with catalytic spillover
into neighboring networks to reproduce and grow that genesis. None of this medieval
invention in banking was inevitable, but “historical contingency” does not have to mean a
great idea, a great man, or even an accident. Multiple systems can feed back into each
other occasionally to produce unpredictable tipping effects, when such interacting
systems are poised. Properly understood to exclude teleology and social Darwinism,
nonlinear path dependence is as characteristic of social evolution as it is of biological
evolution.
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To the extent of course that anything in history is really over. I don’t mean to imply that I place all the

credit for the Renaissance on the doorsteps of these merchant banks. At very least, the political rebirth of
republicanism, and the effect that had on suppressing domestic (certainly not foreign) violence, should get
much credit as well.
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Bonsignori company 1203: 1250: 1251: 1252:
Bonsignore di Bernardo salt
Bonifacius Bonsignoris
4815
Orlandius Bonsignoris
4815
Orlando Bartolomei Malavolti
Aldebrandinus Bartholomei
Hugolinus Belmontis111
Capitino Buctin/ Capucino Bucci112
Bartholomeo Guidii Ciabacte
Andrea Iacobi
Facius Juncte
Bartholomeo Christophori
Theobaldum Thebalducii
Rainerium Tetii
Albizo Deuteaute
Bernardino Prosperini Cendonazi
Bonaventure Bernardini
Aldebrando Aldebrandini
Ruskitello Cambii113
Amanatto Spinetti114

109

1253:

1254:

1255:

5608,6777109 L/6264,6386,6381,6861,6878 7342,7406,7489,7980,8034 XXVIII
5608
L/6264,6386,6446,6861
7197,7406
Ch110 (dir.)
L/5469
6381
Ch
6381
L/5469
L/6264,6386
7197,7489
165
165
165
Ch
L/6264
6861,6878
L/5469
L/5469
7342
XXIII,XXV,XXIV
6381,6446
XXIII,XXV
XXIII
XXIII

8034
7980

1148
1148
1148
1148

Ch,165,XXVIII 1148
XXVII,XXVIII

First mention as campsor domini papae (actually campsoris nostri).
This reorganization (initiation?) of company connected to Sicilian venture? (See Chiaudano, p. 114.) Scali also mobilized as campsors papae at this time.
111
In June 1255, part of Tolomei company (English, p. 15).
112
In June 1255, part of Tolomei company (English, p. 15).
113
Part of Scali company (though not really consolidated yet).
114
Part of Scali company (though not really consolidated yet).
110

1256:
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Bonsignori company
1261:
1262:
1263:
Orlandi Bonsignoris
9,L/44,48,51,L186 53,209
157, 220,277,491
L/40,73,121,L/179,180,182,209
491
Raynerii Jacobi
9,L/44,48,L186
Bonaventura Bernardini
9,L/44,48,51,L186 L/40,53,73,L/179,182,209
157,159,161,166,172,173,174,175,176,177,
(continued)
178,220,277,370,480,491,426
Francisci Guidonis
73,121,L/179,180,182
159,161,166,172,173,176,177,277,370,480,426
Hugolinus Bellimontis
172,426
Facius(Bonifacius) Juncte
9
72,76
172,426
Jacobo Gregorii
L/40,73,180,182
163
Andree Jacobi
9
L/40,72,76,180,182,209
157,159,163, 220,370,480,491
Tholomeo Manenti
157,159,163,166,172, 220,370,480,426
Bonsignori Raynerii
9
73,180,182,209
157,159,163,166,172,220,370,480,491,426
Manno Ildebrandini
73,209
163,491
Jacobo Gilli
73
157,220
Raynerio Bonaccursi
48,51,L186
53,L147
159,163,166,173,220
Deutavivae Guidi
L/44,48,51,L186
53,L147
Ildebrando Ildebrandini
173
Jacopo Ildebrandini
177
Castraleone Hugolini
177
Jacopo Romei
177,277
Gregorio dicto Gonnella
177
Martinello Rubei
177
Rostorius Juncte
163
Bonadota Capud Nigri
163
Corrado Jacobo
(87)
Jacobus Curradi
161
Vivolo Salvanelli
(87)
121,L/179
161,176
Venturae Cambii
(87)
121
161,176
Ventura Benedicti
L/179
161
Lottus Ugolini
161
___ codes if leadership language (i.e., not in transaction, but referenced). ( ) means not Bonsignori company.
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Bonsignori company (Siena) 1265:
Orlandi Bonsignoris
1427,731,1428
Bonaventura Bernardini
1427,726,728,729,730,731,735,738,739,746,747,753,754,755,756,1428,1464,1465,1480,1482
Raynerii Jacobi
1427,728,729,730,746,747,753,755,756,1428,1465
Francisci Guidonis
1427,726,728,729,730,731,735,738,739,746,747,748,753,755,756,1428,1464,1465,1469
Facius(Bonifacius) Juncte
1427,728,746,747,753,1428,1464
Restauro Juncte
1464,1480
Andree Jacobi
Bonsignori Raynerii
1427
Raynerio Bonaccursi
Tholomeo Manenti
1427
Manno Ildebrandini
1427
Blandum Aldebrandi
1427
Jacobo Gilii
1427,746,753,1480,1482
Hugoni Jacobi
1427,728,746,747,753,1428,1464,1480,1482
Jacobo Egidi
728,747,1464
Lotto Hugolini
1427,728,746,753,1428,1464
Gascum Trapillicini
1427,1464,1480,1482
Bindum Aldebrandini
1427
Aldebrandum Aldebrandini 1427,729,730,755,756
Paltonem Deutesalvi
1427,729,730,755,756
Facium Berignonis
1427,755,756
Gregorio Peruti
731
Jacobo Gregorii
738,739
Vivolum Salvanelli
1427
Gregorium Rigoli
1427
Deutaiuvam Guidi
1427
Bindum Falconis
1427
Bonfilium Contadini
1427
Incontratum Philippi
1427
Jacobum Skermi
1427

50

Conradum Jacobi
Bettum Ferrantis
Tholomeum Jacobi
Thomam Viviani
Leonardum Jannis
Facium Ranerii
Pacchinam Ranerii
Meum Monaldetti

1427
1427
1427
1427
1427
1427
1427
1427

sources: numbers are papal bull #s; hence connected to papal curia.
Latin numbers are Liberate Roll #s; hence connected to king of England
“Ch” refers to info from Chiaudano; “L” refers to info from Lunt; “E” refers to info from English.
colors: red = France (anywhere else); blue = England; pink = Montpelier; orange = Champagne; green = Spain; purple = Charles of Anjou
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Bonsignori company
Orlandi Bonsignoris
Bonaventura Bernardini
Raynerii Jacobi
Francisci Guidonis
Facius(Bonifacius) Juncte
Guidoni Juncte
Restauro Juncte
Hugoni Jacobi
Raynerio Jacobi
Andree Jacobi
Bonsignori Raynerii
Manno Ildebrandini
Raynerio Bonaccursi
Tholomeo Manenti
Jacobo Gilii
Jacobo Egidi
Lotto Hugolini
Aldebrando Aldebrandini
Jacobo Aldobrandini
Paltono Deutesalvi
Gregorio Peruti
Jacobo Gregorii
Pultrono Frederici
Facio Berignonis
Gasconi Trapillicino
Bartholomeo Henrici
Gregorio Gonnelle

1266:
761,789
761,779,783,784,794,1483,1484
761,779, L173
779,780,781,783,784,788,1483,1484
779,784,1483,1484, L173
1483,1484
1483,1484
783,1483,1484
783,1483
761
761
761

1483,1484
779,784,1483,1484

1267:
798,
797,798,

803,804
804
803,804

798
797

794
794
1483,1484
1484

803
798
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Mario Chiaudono (1935), p. 134-35:
“Soci e capitani della Compagnia dei figli di Bonsignore
(Societas filioum Bonsignoris) nel 1289:
Figli di Orlando Bonsignore:
1. Fatius eques
2. Ugo
3. Guilelmus
4. Bonsignore
Figlio di Bonifazio Bonsignore:
5. Nicolaus eques
Soci estranei alla famiglia Bonsignori e loro capitali:
6. Bonaventura Bernardini
7. Rainerius Iacobi
8. Pagnus Giliocti
9. Fatius Berignonis
10. Conradus Berignonis
11. Manfredus Ranucii de Balzis
12. Gerius Montanini
13. Mevius domini Orlandi de Malavoltis
14. Bindus Aldobrandi
15. Tura Bartholomei
16. Claritus Iohannis
17. Thalomeus Manentis
18. Ventura o Tura Bonamici
19. Arbor Bernardini
20. Bartholomeus Henrici
21. Vannes Henrici
22. Mattheus Albizi
23. Angelus Benvenuti
Total capital

6800 lib.
5200 lib.
3000 lib.
3000 lib.
2500 lib.
3000 lib.
3000 lib.
2500 lib.
2500 lib.
2500 lib.
2500 lib.
2100 lib.
1500 lib.
1200 lib.
___
___
___
___
40,800 lib.
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Scali company (Florence) 1229: 1233: 1235: 1245: 1249: 1250: 1253:
Mainetto Robertin
XV
Bonaccorso Inglesk
B:Eng.
Amieri Cose
B:Engl.B:Eng.B:Eng. XV
B:England
B:Eng. XV
Spigliato Cambii115
Rocco(Rustichello) Cambii117
B:Eng.
XXIII
Manetto Spini(Spineti)
B:Eng.
B:Eng. XXI XXIII
Pietro Benincase118
Ranieri Abbati
Hugoni(dicto Mazze) Simonetti
XXI
Deuteayuto Guillelmi
Jacopo della Scala
B:Eng.(+others)
Cavalcante(Cante) de Scala
Jacobi Giberti119
Hugoni Gilberti
Benvenuto Will’i
Gerardo Ricobaldi
Bernardo Persperin120
Aldebrando Aldebrandini121
Jacobo Dananzaci
Berardo Ricobaldi
Petro de Sabaudia
Luterio Bonycase
115

7069

1254:

XXVI
XXVI

7529

1255: 1256: 1257: 1258: 1259:
B:Eng.B:Eng.
B:Gasc.B:Eng.116
B:Gasc.B:Eng.B:Eng.XXXIII XXXV,XXXVII
B:Gasc.B:Eng.B:Eng.
B:Gasc.B:Eng.
B:Eng.
B:Eng.
B:Eng.
B:Gascony
B:Eng.

7529,7227

XXI
XXI
XXI
XXIII
XXIII

XXXIII XXXV
XXXIII XXXV
XXXIII XXXV
XXXVII
XXXVII

Due to strange English spellings, I assume Spigliato Cambi = Spinello Campano.
These loans part of Sicilian venture: a papal-English taxation joint venture. But also some of them straight to king. Jordan, p.11, says Scali made campsor papae.
117
Rocco Cambi = Rustichello Cambi, according to both Borsari and Kay. [See article by Richard Kay in Studi Danteschi on his suicide.]
118
Due to strange English spellings, I assume Pietro Benincase = Petro Bonacaso.
119
As of 1262, he is in Bellindotti company.
120
As of 1255, his son, Benvenuto Bernardini, is part of Bonsignori company of Siena.
121
As of 1255, this Sienese is part of Bonsignori company.
116

54

sources: numbers are papal bull #s; hence connected to papal curia.
Latin numbers are Liberate Roll #s; hence connected to king of England.
“B:” info from Borsari.
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Scali company (Florence)
England:
Jacobum Cambii
Diritta(Dricta) Cambii
Rucco(Rustichello) Cambii122
Manetto(Maynetto) Spine
Lotherio Benincase
Ranieri Abbati
Hugonetto(Mace) Simonetti
Florence and elsewhere:
Amieri Cose
Jacobus(Lapus) Amierii Cose
Jacopo de Scala
Cavalcante(Cante) Jacobi de Scala
Spina Jacobi de Scala
Teghia Jacobi de Scala
Thomasio(Maso) Spiliati
Pietro Benincase
Dino Perini
Jacobo Lecca
Campana Francisci
Hugo(Ugo) Spine
Teghia Amadoris
Gerardinus Beliotti
Rustichello Tedaldi

1261:

XXXVIII
XXXVIII

B:p
B:p
B:p
B:p,22
B:p
B:p,22
B:p
B:p
B:p
B:p
B:p
B:p
B:p
B:p

1262:

1263:

1264:

B:p/E,L/125
B:p/E,L/125
B:p/E
B:p/E,L/125

A,363
A,363,479,327
A,363,479
A,363,479
A,363,479,327

1012
519
519
519
519,1012
519

A,363
A,363,212
A,363,327
A,363,212
A,363,212
A,363,212
A,363,212
A,363

519,1012
519,1012
519,1012
519,1012
519,1012
519
519
519,1012

A,363,212
A,363,212
A,363
A,363,212
212

519
519,1012
519
519

B:p/E,L/125

B:p/E,L/125
B:p/E,L/125

1265: 1268: 1269:

1469
XLI

XLIII,XLIV,XLV
XLIII,XLIV,XLV

726
1469
1469
726

sources: numbers are papal bull #s; hence connected to papal curia. “p” means pope.
Latin numbers are Liberate Roll #s; hence connected to king of England. “p/E” means pope/England relations.
“B:” info from Borsari; “L” info from Lunt; “A” info from Arias: “Sottomissione dei Banchieri Fiorentini alla Chiesa.”
122

Cambii family later becomes the magnate family of de Mozzi. Therefore, Mozzi (also Spini) banks spins out of Scali bank.
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Scali company
[from Edouard Jordan]

1282 & 1284:

Cieffus Bonisegne
Maynettus Hugonis
Lapus de Scala
Jacobus Aymerii Cosae
Johannes Aymerii Cosae
Albertus Aymerii Cosae
Folia Aymerii Cosae
Alamannus Aymerii Cosae
Castellanus Lapi
Lippus Petri Benincasae
Riccasrdus Petri Benincasae
Tegla Amadoris
Bonacosa Cosa Fulchi
Ugolinus de Vichio
Lotherius Bonaguide
Bonapresa Importuni

Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis
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Tolomei company (Siena)
1257: 1260:
Ranierio Raulii
Catalano di Alfano
Bartolomeo di Guazzolino
Manente d’Uguccione
Tolomeo di Tolomeo della Piazza
Tavena di Tolomeo Tolomei
Lotterengo di Tolomeo Tolomei
Pelacane di Tolomeo Tolomei
Jacopo della Piazza
Tolomeo di Jacobo Tolomei
Cristoforo di Tolomeo Tolomei
Jacobo di Tolomeo Tolomei
Rinaldo di Jacobo Tolomei
Cristoforo di Jacopo Tolomei
Andrea di Cristoforo Tolomei
Lotterengo d’Uguccione Tolomei
Bartolomeo di Pietro Tolomei
Orlando Bonasera
Deutaviva di Guido
Turchio di Ranieri
Leo di Teodorico
Ofriduccio di Rustibello
Dietisalve di Benintende
Accarigi di Ranuccio
Petrus Montanarius
123
124

1223: 1226: 1227: 1230: 1243: 1248: 1251-3:1231253:

1254: 1255: 1255:124

1255:

M:lc
M:lc
M:lc
EM:cl. M:lc
EM:cl. M:lc

M:lc

M:lc
M:lc
M:lc
M:lc

M:lc
M:lc
M:lc

453

M:lc

453

M:p

ME:p

M:p

E:Ch
E:Ch.
ME:p E:Ch.

M:lc
M:lc
M:lc
M:lc

.

453
6468

M:p

M:lc
347

M:lc
6468
6468

M:p
M:p
M:p
M:p
M:p
M:p
M:p

ME:p,28,29
E:p
ME:p,28,29
ME:p,28,29

29

The loans below are from various combinations of these Tolomei, over this period of time. Not clearly integrated into unified block of soci yet.
This, on the other hand, is a single loan to pope. (Mucciarelli, 1995, pp. 99-100)

E:Eng.
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Johannes Cesarii
1223: 1226: 1227: 1230: 1243: 1248: 1251-3:1251253:

29
1254: 1255:126

1260:
Raynaldus Renerii
Jacobi Theci
Luca Ricovarii
Montanino Deutesalve
Bartholomeo Comitis
Henrico Deuteaiut
Jacobo Rustikino
Hugolino Gentili
Albizo Deuteaiut
Capitano di Bucce127
Ugolino di Belimonte128

125

6468 7981
6468
6468
347
347
347
347
347
347

6468

ME:p
ME:p

The loans below are from various combinations of these Tolomei, over this period of time. Not clearly integrated into unified block of soci yet.
This, on the other hand, is a single loan to pope. (Mucciarelli, 1995, pp. 99-100)
127
Also partner in Bonsignori company.
128
Also partner in Bonsignori company.
126

1255: 1257:
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“cl.” = cloth; “lc” = loan to city; “p” = pope; “v” = vescovo; “Ch.” = Champagne; “Eng.” = England; “Fl.” = Flanders.
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Tolomei company (Siena)
Orlando di Baldistricca Tolomei
Tolomeo di Jacobo Tolomei
Pietro di Cristoforo Tolomei
Andrea di Cristoforo Tolomei
Minus di Cristoforo Tolomei
Guillelmus et
Meus Raynaldi, eorum nepotes
Tholomei Reginaldi
Christofori Tholomei
Lotheringi Uguicionis

1262: 1263: 1264: 1265:
E:Siena
E:Siena
E:Siena175
745
E:Ch. 175
521? 745,E:Ch.
175
175
175
745
745
745

Federigo Doni
E:Fl.
Tebaldus Alteville
Bartholomeus et Aringherius Jacobi

Tolomeo di Rinaldo Tolomei
Luca di Bonsignore
Tofano di Bonsignore
Cino di Pietro

175
175

745,E:Eng.

1269:

1279:

E:exile
E:Ch.

E:Fl.

521?

E:Siena
E:Ch.
E:Ch.
E:Ch.

[To be honest, apart from the heavy and repeated business of the Tolomei family, this not really solidly consistent.
Still a fluid partnership structure, even with noble family participation. The pope mobilized by creating the combined
Scotti-Tolomei company (even if short-lived), not by using this regular Tolomei one very consistently.]
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Scotti and Tolomei company (Siena)
Petrus Scotti Dominici
Rinaldus Tolomei
Tholomeo Raynaldi
Reinaldum Rainerii130
Gregorius Bernardini
Lotteringus Corradi
Jacobus Raynaldi
Christoforus Tolomei
Raynucius(Raynerius) de Vallestricte
Aldebrandinus Tholomei
Petrus Christophori
Raynucius(Raynalducio) Johannis
Bonuncuntrus Scotti Dominici
Scotto Dominici
Jacobus Romei
Rubeus Consilii
Raynerius Citadini
Paulus Albertini
Jacobus Balioni
Ventura Martini
Bonrestorus Scotti
Jacobus Ugolini
Bonagratia Ardimanni
Bencivenne Consilii

129

1255: 1256: 1258: 1262:129
J
M:p J
46
J
J
46
M:p
J
46
J
46
J
46
M:p J
46
J
46
J
46
J
46
J
46
J
46
46
J
46
J
46
J
46
J
46
J
J
J
J
J
J

This actually ‘trial’ of Scotti-Tolomei bank by pope Urban IV. Alexander IV had appointed this company as campsores papae, but for some reason
Urban IV unhappy with them.
130
This guy shows up a lot in early papal refs, connected to other partners. Track these down & staple together (in 1256 only?)
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Ventura Fornari
Raniero Barbotti
Ermino Erminii
Giacomo Teci

M:Eng.
M:Eng.
M:Eng.
M:Eng.

63

Ricciardi company (Lucca)
Paganino Guidiccioni
Aldibrandino Guidiccioni
Bandino del Lucano Bugianensis
Opizi(Opitone) Malisardi

122?: 1227: 1231: 1234: 1241: 1245: 1247: 1251: 1253: 1254-5: 1256: 1263: 1266:
P:Luc.
BP:Luc.
BP:Luc.
BP:Luc.

Ricciardo di Graziano di Ricciardo, tintor
Perfetto di Graziano di Ricciardo
Gottifredo di Conetto [uncle?]
Orlandino del Antelmino Minusvetti
Alamanno (monete contraffatte)
Rosselmo del Mainetto Minusvetti
Mainetto Minusvetti
maestro Giovanni
Orlandino Arnolfi
Guglielmo Rosciompelli

P:Luc. P:Luc. BP:Luc.P:Luc. BP:Luc.
BP:Luc.
BP:Luc.
BP:Luc.
BP:Luc.

Peregrino Sesmundi
Reynero detto Senaci Guidiccioni(?)
Henrico Saraceni
Bartholomeo Bendini
Luco(Luke) Natali
Reiner Magiari
Baroncinus di Gu(W)alterius de Vulturna
Richardo Guidechonis
Theobaldino Maniumac
Guido Panichi: procurator only

P:Lucca
P:Lucca
P:Lucca
P:Genoa
BP:Luc.
BP:Luc.
BP:Luc.K:England
K:England

RK:Eng.K:Eng.RKP:Eng.
R:Eng.
RKP:Eng.
RK:Eng.K:Eng.RKP:Eng.
RKP:Eng.
RKP:Eng.K:Eng.K:Eng.
K:Eng.
(K:Eng.)(K:Eng.)
(K:Cham)
(K:Cham)
(P:Genoa)
( ) = not yet part of comp
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Ricciardi company (Lucca)
1272: 1273: 1276-83:
dominus Andree Parentii Ricciardi
Philippi domini Raynerii Ricciardi
Ricciardus domini Raynerii Ricciardi
Pagani/uccio Guidi Guidiccionis
Guidiccione Paganini Guidiccionis
Raynerii Bandini
Philipucii Talgardi
Saraceni Macchi
P:G131
Iohannis Gambardi

1283: 1284: 1286:
A:Luc.
A:Luc.
A:Luc.
B:Luc. A:Luc
B:Luc. A:Luc.
A:Luc.
A:Luc.
A:Luc.
A

Lucasio Natale132 (Luke de Luka) P:G KP:Eng.KP:Eng.
Bandino del Lucano
P:Eng.
Uguccione Maghiari
P:Eng.
Ranieri(Raynerius) Maghiarii133
K:Eng. RKPL:Eng
Orlandino di Pogio134 (Podio)
RKP:Eng.
Henricus de Podio
K:Eng.
Bartolotto del Buggianese Bandini
P:Eng.,Paris
Matteo Rosciompelli
RKP:Eng.
Adiuti Rosciompili
K:Eng.
Vannes Rosciompeli
Abbate Talgardi
K:Eng.
Giovanni Simonetti Sismondi
P:G
KP:Eng.
KP:Eng.
Riccardo Paganini Guidiccionis135 P:G
Tommasinus Paganini Guidi Guidiccionis K:Eng. KP:Eng.
Aldebrandino Guidiccioni
K:Eng.
Federigi Venture
K:Eng.
Riccardo Bonifacii136
RK:Eng.
Baroncino Gualteri137 (in Eng 23 yrs before)
Brunetto Baroncini Gualteri
Riccardo Baroncini Gualteri
Opizzo(Opiso) Malisardi
P:G
K:Eng.
(inlaw of Gualteri)

L:Eng.

(d.1279)

L:Eng.
L:Eng.
L:Eng.
L:Eng. B
L:Eng.

A
[why no A?]
K:Gascony

Hugolino Rosciompelli
Percival Gerarducci
Bendino Panichi(Peruchi)
Ghirardo Chimbardi
Francesco Malisardi
131

P:G

R:Ire. K:Ireland
K:Ireland
KP:Ireland

A
A
L:Eng.
A
L:Eng.
A
L:Eng. B:Luc. [why no A?]
L:Eng. B:Luc. A
B

L:Eng.

A
K:Eng.
K:left comp
K:left comp
K:left comp
K:left comp

A:Ireland
K:Ireland
KP:Ireland

P:G refers to one-shot loan in 1272 at Genoa to Prince Edward (future Edward I), coming back from crusades.
See Del Punto, p. 163.
132
Liberate Roll #s: In 1273: 48, 49, 49b, 50. In 1274: 52, 53, 56, 57, 58. In 1275: 61, 64, 65. In 1276: 68, 71.
133
Liberate Roll #s: In 1278: 76, 78. In 1279: 79, 82. In 1280: 83,
134
Liberate Roll #s: In 1277: 72, 73. In 1278: 74, 75, 76, 77. In 1280: 80, 80b, 84. In 1296: 95.
135
Liberate Roll #s: In 1281: 86. In 1289: 89. In 1290: 90, 93. In 1292: 94.
136
Liberate Roll #s: In 1290: 90, 93.
137
Liberate Roll #s: In 1281: 85, 86. In 1282: 87. In 1285: 88.
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Ricciardi company (Lucca)
1272: 1273: 1276-83:
(continued)
Riccardo Rosciompelli
K:Gascony
Francesco Maneumach
K:Paris
Lotto Aldebrandini
K:Paris
Bindo di Giovanni Simonetti
P:Paris?
Barchetta Barche
P:Paris?
Ricciardinus domini Bonfatii Gottori
Labro Volpelli
Dino Tadolini

K:Eng. KP:curia
P:curia

Frederigus Sarracini Incallocchiati
Nicolucius Bonacursii Mignosii
Guido Panichi, procurator only138
Bandino de Fondora, procurator only

1283: 1284: 1286:

B
B
KP:curia
A:Ravenna
A:Ravenna

(P:Gen.)
(P:Gen.)

[sources: R = Re; K = Kaeuper; B = Blomquist; P = Del Punto; L = Lunt; A = Arias]

138

The exception that proves rule? Genoa uses agents, not filiali.
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Ricciardi company (Lucca)
dominus Andree Parentii Ricciardi
Philippi domini Raynerii Ricciardi
Ricciardus domini Raynerii Ricciardi
Pagani/uccio Guidi Guidiccionis
Guidiccione Paganini Guidiccionis
Franciscus Guiditionis
Raynerii Bandini
Philipucii Talgardi
Saraceni Macchi
Iohannis Gambardi

1286:
A:Luc.
A:Luc.
A:Luc.
A:Luc
A:Luc.

Ranieri(Raynerius) Maghiarii
Orlandino di Pogio139 (Podio)
Henricus de Podio
Riccardus Pogii
Bartolotto del Buggianese Bandini
Adiuti(Adjustus) Rosciompili
Vannes Rosciompeli
Abbate Talgardi
Giovanni Simonetti Sismondi
Riccardo Paganini Guidiccionis140
Tommasinus Paganini Guidi Guidiccionis
Aldebrandino Guidiccioni
Lotto Aldebrandini
Federigi Venture
Riccardo Bonifacii141
Bendino Panichi(Peruchi)
Ghirardo Chimbardi
Francesco Malisardi

A
[why no A?]
K:Gascony

Labro Volpelli
Dino Tadolini
Vantes Honestis

A:Luc.
A:Luc.
A:Luc.
A

A
A
A
A
[why no A?]
A

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J

A
K:Eng.
A:Ireland
K:Ireland
KP:Ireland
KP:curia

[sources: A = Arias: J = Jordan]
Liberate Roll #s: In 1296: 95.
Liberate Roll #s: In 1289: 89. In 1290: 90, 93. In 1292: 94.
141
Liberate Roll #s: In 1290: 90, 93.
140

J

J

Ricciardinus domini Bonfatii Gottori
Paganellus seu Nellus Gualandi
Ghinus Christophori
Bonaventura Romanioli
Nicolutius Liene
Banus Pili Rictii

139

Pope Martin IV

J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
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1263-64 companies absolved from excommunication142 143 144
[bull numbers from Registres d’Urbain IV, vol. 2.]
1) de Burgo company of Florence
Dulcis de Burgo
Boldus de Burgo
Hugo Monaldi
Moczius de Burgo
Gualterus de Burgo
Gerus de Burgo
Castra Gualfredi
Hugettus Symonetti
Spinellus Symonetti
Donatellus Octaviani
Dulcis Octaviani
Johannes Bonaviti
Rubeus Bacharelli
Lapus Stibaldi
Johannutius Bajamontis
Ranutius Ardingi

[n. 362: 5 August 1263]

2) Rimbertini company of Florence [n. 364: 27 August 1263]
Philippus Radulphi
Frankettus Rembertini
Maynettus Rembertini
Jacobus Rembertini
Franciscus Rembertini
Frankettus Bencivenni
Raynaldus Uberti
Dosius Uberti
Ubertus Raynaldi
Pucius Raynaldi
Guelfus Raynaldi
Scolarius Radulphi
Rota Amannati
Michael Amannati
Bucca Amannati
Matheus Bonfilioli
Cantius Symonetti
Bonvicinus Nicolai
142

This procedure makes these lists of partners complete, unlike the usual case with papal transactions.

143

The Bonsignori, Scali and Tolomei companies are not listed here, because they were coded elsewhere in

the appendix. Their Urban IV bull numbers and dates of absolution were the following, respectively: n.
161, 5 July 1263; n. 363: 27 August 1263; and n. 175, 5 January 1263.
144

Discipuli or non-partner employees were also included in the registers, but these not reproduced here.

68

3) Bardi company of Florence
Gianni Bonaguide Bardi
Matheus Bonaguide Bardi
Lapus Bonaguide Bardi
Coltus Bonaguide Bardi
Riccus Beltrami
Guarnerius Mathei
Antoninus, filius Gerii

[n. 410: 27 September 1263]

4) Bellicozi company of Florence
Cambius Manerii Bellicozi
Persus Manerii Bellicozi
Perus Manerii Bellicozi
Giannianus Tebaldi
Zione Tebaldi

[n. 411: 26 September 1263]

5) Bellincioni company of Florence [n. 428: 23 October 1263]
Ildebrandinus Bellincionis
Bellincione(Cione) Ildebrandinus Bellincionis
Cambiutius Ildebrandinus Bellincionis
Caccia (notarius) Bonciani
Cenni Bonciani
6) Benvenuti del Bene company of Florence [n. 429: 27 October 1263]
Ildebrandinus Benvenuti del Bene
Franciscum Benvenuti del Bene
Phylippus Benvenuti del Bene
Ugolinus Benvenuti del Bene
7) Acquerelli ‘company’ of Florence
[n. 430: 2 November 1263]
Ildebrandinus (judex) Gerardi de Acquerellis
Giacottus Gerardi de Acquerellis
Peroctus Gerardi de Acquerellis
Roggerus (patruus suus) quondam Ildebrandini de Acquerellis
Dinus Joseppi
Cervellinus(Cinus) Dini Joseppi
[but word ‘socii’ not used in this ‘company’]
8) de Bella company of Florence
[n. 447: 10 November 1263]
Comparinus Tedaldi de Bella
Janus Tedaldi de Bella
Hugo Melioris de Bella
Gabriel Donati Bucetunde
Dessus Donati Bucetunde
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9) Puccii et Dosii Albizi of Florence [n. 463: 5 December 1263]
Dosius quondam Albizi
Pepus(Puccius) quondam Albizi
10) Vinciguerre company of Florence [n. 465: 23 December 1263]
Duccius Rogeri Vinciguerre
Nerus Rogeri Vinciguerre
Rusticus Rogeri Vinciguerre
11) Phylippi company of Florence [n. 501: 5 February 1264]
Cambius Phylippi
Raynerius Phylippi
Capiardinus Guillelmi Danielis
Lapus Bizochi Marci
Marcutius Bizochi Marci
12) Rossi company of Florence
Johannes Rossi
Catellus Rossi
Marus Rossi
Rossus Conradi(Cafagii)

[n. 557: 29 April 1264]

13) Abbati ‘company’ of Florence [n. 570: 14 May 1264]
Lambertus(Tuctius) Abbatis
Jacobus (clericus et procurator) Abbatis
[but word ‘socii’ not used in this ‘company’]
14) Cerchi founder in Florence (not company) [n. 574: 28 May 1264]
Circulum Olivieri
15) Frescobaldi company of Florence [n. 701: 3 August 1264]
Bardus Lamberti Frascobaldi
Jacobus Lamberti Frascobaldi
Coppus Joseppi
Corbolinus Bencii

70
16) Donosdei company of Pistoia [n. 702: 3 August 1264]
Egidius Donosdei
Melior Pelegrini
Accursis Lesii
Bonadies Bonadiei
Henrigetti Bonadiei
Pecora Novanterii
Stancollus(Collus) Raynuzini
Meo (domini) Raynuzini
Matheus Thomasini
Bindus Armaleonis
17) Ammannati company of Pistoia [n. 703: 30 July 1264]
Bandinus Ammannati
Bartholomeus Ammannati
Framericus Baldeti
Fuccius Soffredi
Forese Jacobi
Corradutius Jacobi
Sarracenus Jacobi
Conte Montancolli
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1265 companies absolved from excommunication
[bull numbers from Registres de Clement IV]
18) Cerchi “societate” of Florence (again) [Clement IV n. 86: 2 juin 1265]
Circuli Oliverii Circuli
Bindus Galligaii de Mactis
Teglarius Tedaldi
Ubertus Cambii
Manfridus Oderici
Naddus Boniczi
Taldus Raynerii
Guiducius Oderici
Naddus Boniczi
Taldus Raynerii
Guiducius Cavalcanti
Bonsignore Bonaiuti
19) Frescobaldi company of Florence (again) [Clement IV n. 87: 3 June 1265]
Jacobus Riccomandi
Albertinus Rote
Ghinus Fruscobaldi
Barduccius Lamberti Fruscobaldi
Jacobus Lamberti Fruscobaldi
Hugolinus Benivieni
Coppus Joseppi
Rainerius Joseppi
Corbolinus Benivi
Meliorellus Allioni
Puccinus Amatoris
Restorinus Spiliati
20) Rubei et Arditionis company of Florence [Clement IV n. 143: 13 July 1265]
Fuctius Rubei
Cinus Jacobi Arditionis
Ricchus Jacobi
Julianus Ricchi
Clarus Oliverii
Riccus Bonaguide
Nerus Fornarii
Angelerius Bonelle
Petrus Corbizi
Ricchus Salvaterre
21) Rimbottus Bonaiuti of Siena [Clement IV n. 158: 23 October 1265]
Rimbottus Bonaiuti
Tucius et Acherisius, filii ejus

